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CONTROLLING AND DETERRING FRIVOLOUS IN FORMA
PAUPERIS COMPLAINTS
INTRODUCTION
Each year the courts are flooded with growing numbers of meritless
complaints, I many of which are brought by plaintiffs proceeding in forma
pauperis2 (IFP) under 28 U.S.C. § 1915. 3 Meritless suits clog the courts
and reduce the capacity of the entire system to deal with meritorious
claims.4 Some courts attempt to deter non-indigent frivolous lawsuits by
assessing monetary sanctions against plaintiffs or their attorneys.5 Such
measures, however, cannot be applied practically against either indigents
1. See generally Martineau, Frivolous Appeals: The Uncertain Federal Response, 1984
Duke L.J. 845, 845-49 (1984) (survey of response to frivolous appeals from decisions of
the federal courts of appeals); Partridge, A Complaint Based on Rumors Countering Friv-
olous Litigation, 31 Loy. L. Rev. 221, 222, 226-27 (1985) (noting the rise of unfounded
legal action).
2. There are two aspects to the problem of frivolous IFP litigation. The first consists
of egregious cases of IFP litigants filing multiple frivolous suits and motions. See, e.g., In
re Martin-Trigona, 737 F.2d 1254, 1259 (2d Cir. 1984), cert denied, 106 S. Ct. 807 (1986)
(plaintiff filed over 250 frivolous complaints against "bankruptcy judges, trustees, attor-
neys and their families and associates" connected with his bankruptcy proceedings); In re
Green, 669 F.2d 779, 781-82 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (inmate filed over 600 complaints most of
which were dismissed as frivolous). The second aspect of frivolous IFP litigation is the
problem of numerous plaintiffs proceeding in forma pauperis who each file one or two
frivolous complaints. Actions brought in forma pauperis consist predominantly of pris-
oner civil rights actions that have increased dramatically in recent years from 218 peti-
tions fied in 1966 to 18,034 such suits filed in 1984. See Procup v. Strickland, 792 F.2d
1069, 1071 (11th Cir. 1986) (citing Administrative Office of the United States Courts,
Annual Report of the Director 142-43 (1984)); see also Turner, When Prisoners Sue: A
Study of Prisoner Section 1983 Suits in the Federal Courts, 92 Harv. L Rev. 610, 617
(1979) (survey of prisoner section 1983 actions showed that 85% to 95% of suits were
filed in forma pauperis). Courts find the majority of these prisoner in forma pauperis
actions to be without merit. See Green v. McKaskle, 788 F.2d 1116, 1118 (5th Cir.
1986); Weller v. Dickson, 314 F.2d 598, 602 (9th Cir.) (Duniway, J., concurring), cert.
denied, 375 U.S. 845 (1963); Cotner v. Campbell, 618 F. Supp. 1091, 1095 (E.D. Okla.
1985), aff'd in part sub nom. Cotner v. Hopkins, 795 F.2d 900 (10th Cir. 1986) (per
curiam); Johnson v. Baskerville, 568 F. Supp. 853, 855 (E.D. Va. 1983) (quoting
Grouchulski v. New York, 481 F. Supp. 1294, 1296 (N.D.N.Y. 1980)); Federal Judicial
Center Prisoner Civil Rights Committee Recommended Procedures for Handling Pris-
oner Civil Rights Cases in the Federal Courts 9 (1980) [hereinafter Federal Judicial
Center]; Duniway, The Poor Man in the Federal Courts, 18 Stan. L. Rev. 1270, 1285
(1966). Although many of the cases cited in this Note are prisoner IFP proceedings, the
procedures discussed are intended to apply in non-prisoner proceedings as well.
3. 28 U.S.C. § 1915 (1982). Section 1915 authorizes the maintenance of an action in
federal courts without prepayment of fees.
4. See Green v. McKaskle, 788 F.2d 1116, 1120 (5th Cir. 1986); Jones v. Morris, 777
F.2d 1277, 1279 (7th Cir. 1985); Anderson v. Coughlin, 700 F.2d 37, 42 (2d Cir. 1983).
5. See, eg., Hughes v. Rowe, 449 U.S. 5, 14 (1980) (per curiam) (attorney's fees
incurred in opposing action may be recovered from plaintiff when " 'plaintiff's action was
frivolous, unreasonable, or without foundation' ") (quoting Christiansburg Garment Co.
v. EEOC, 434 U.S. 412, 421 (1978)); Martin v. Commissioner, 756 F.2d 38, 41 (6th Cir.
1985) (court assessed not only double costs, but also damages incurred by government for
frivolous appeal). Courts also may assess fees and costs against a plaintiff's attorney
under Fed. R. Civ. P. 11. See Badillo v. Central Steel & Wire Co., 717 F.2d 1160, 1166
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or many pro se plaintiffs.6 Courts recognize a need to curb the abuses
associated with IFP litigation, yet wish to ensure that IFP plaintiffs with
legitimate complaints are not barred in the process.7 Thus, they have
sought a balance between managing their dockets and safeguarding ac-
cess to the courts.8
This Note examines the provisions contained in 28 U.S.C. § 1915 that
may be used to control IFP litigation. Part I focuses on sections 1915(a)
and 1915(d) and argues that these sections authorize the district courts to
implement procedures that streamline the processing of IFP applications
through prefiling dismissal. Part II focuses on section 1915(a) in con-
junction with 1915(e). These sections grant the courts the authority to
require FP plaintiffs to pay certain costs to deter frivolous suits. These
payments may be obtained through partial payment plans,9 step-by-step
payment plans, 10 and monetary sanctions.11 This Note argues that
courts should adopt procedures for prefiling review that facilitate the
(7th Cir. 1983); Anderson v. Allstate Insur. Co., 630 F.2d 677, 684 (9th Cir. 1980)
(same).
Although a court may apply Rule 11 sanctions to pro se indigents, see Fed. R. Civ. P.
11, this Note will not address its application to the processing of in forma pauperis appli-
cations for two reasons. First, none of the cases concerning dismissal of in forma pauperis
complaints consider Rule 11 as an alternative. Second, the Rule 11 advisory committee
notes state that before Rule 11 sanctions may be imposed, a plaintiff must be given an
opportunity to oppose the motion. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 348 advisory committee's notes.
This procedure would defeat the objective of providing courts with a more efficient pro-
cess for managing in forma pauperis complaints.
6. Courts have characterized the grant of IFP status as a shield of immunity. See
Boyce v. Alizaduh, 595 F.2d 948, 951 n.6 (4th Cir. 1979) (" 'Persons proceeding in forma
pauperis are immune from imposition of costs ..... ' ) (quoting Jones v. Bales, 58 F.R.D.
453, 463 (N.D. Ga. 1972), aff'd without opinion per curiam, 480 F.2d 805 (5th Cir.
1973)). Rather than suggesting that the grant of IFP status renders persons proceeding
in forma pauperis immune from any costs, the better inference is that a court or prevail-
ing party might be unable to enforce a judgment against IFP plaintiffs because of their
poverty. Flint v. Haynes, 651 F.2d 970, 972-73 nn.5 & 6 (4th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 454
U.S. 1151 (1982). See In re American President Lines, Ltd., 804 F.2d 1307, 1310 nn.5 &
6 (D.C. Cir. 1986) (per curiam) (court did not award attorneys' fees to prevailing defend-
ant because it recognized that such order would be futile in light of plaintiff's indigent
status); In re Martin-Trigona, 737 F.2d 1254, 1262 (2d Cir. 1984) (assessment of costs
against IFP plaintiff futile in light of his alleged poverty resulting from bankruptcy pro-
ceedings), cert. denied, 106 S. Ct. 807 (1986).
7. See Horsey v. Asher, 741 F.2d 209, 212 (8th Cir. 1984); Anderson v. Coughlin,
700 F.2d 37, 41-42 (2d Cir. 1982); cf Procup v. Strickland, 760 F.2d 1107, 1110-11 (1 th
Cir.) (en banc) (overbroad injunction impermissibly barred plaintiff's access to courts),
vacated on other grounds and remanded, 792 F.2d 1069 (1 1th Cir. 1986); Demos v.
Kincheloe, 563 F. Supp. 30, 33 (E.D. Wash. 1982) (courts tailor sanctions to maintain
balance between preservation of right to access and protection of judicial process).
8. See Green v. McKaskle, 788 F.2d 1116, 1120 (5th Cir. 1986); Jones v. Morris, 777
F.2d 1277, 1280 (7th Cir. 1985); Phillips v. Mashburn, 746 F.2d 782, 784 (11 th Cir. 1984)
(per curiam); Horsey v. Asher, 741 F.2d 209, 212 (8th Cir. 1984); Green v. Warden, 699
F.2d 364, 369-70 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 461 U.S. 960 (1983).
9. See, e.g., In re Williamson, 786 F.2d 1336, 1338 (8th Cir. 1986); see infra notes
100-20 and accompanying text.
10. See, eg., Braden v. Estelle, 428 F. Supp. 595, 599 (S.D. Tex. 1977); see infra notes
121-36 and accompanying text.
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screening of IFP applications in addition to procedures for assessing
costs against IFP plaintiffs in order to reduce the number of frivolous
complaints initially presented to the court.
I. REVIEW AND DISMISSAL OF IFP APPLICATIONS
Congress enacted 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)' 2 to enable plaintiffs who could
not afford the costs of litigation to bring civil lawsuits in federal courts
without prepayment of fees.' At the same time, Congress, apparently
concerned about the potential for abuse, vested the courts with discre-
tionary powers of dismissal under section 1915(d)."4 An IFP complaint
can be dismissed sua sponte under section 1915(d) on grounds of frivo-
11. See, eg., Cotner v. Hopkins, 795 F.2d 900, 902 (10th Cir. 1986) (per curiam); see
infra notes 137-53 and accompanying text.
12. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a) (1982) provides in part:
(a) Any court of the United States may authorize the commencement, prosecu-
tion or defense of any suit, action or proceeding, civil or criminal, or appeal
therein, without prepayment of fees and costs or security therefor, by a person
who makes affidavit that he is unable to pay such costs or give security therefor.
Such affidavit shall state the nature of the action, defense or appeal and aliant's
belief that he is entitled to redress.
13. H.R. Rep. No. 1079, 52d Cong., 1st Sess. 2 (1892); see also Adkins v. E.I. DuPont
de Nemours & Co., 335 U.S. 331, 342 (1948) (section 1915 guaranteed "that no citizen
shall be denied an opportunity to commence, prosecute, or defend an action... solely
because his poverty makes it impossible for him to pay or secure the costs [of
litigation]").
14. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(d) (1982) provides: "The court may request an attorney to rep-
resent any such person unable to employ counsel and may dismiss the case if the allega-
tion of poverty is untrue, or if satisfied that the action is frivolous or malicious."
Congress included section 1915(d), which authorizes dismissal, to prevent the possibil-
ity of court congestion and the expenditure of public funds arising from frivolous
lawsuits:
The proposed law will not admit of vexatious litigation. It is well guarded ....
The court may dismiss the [complaint] at any time if it be made to appear
that the allegation of poverty is untrue, or if he be satisfied that the alleged
cause of action is frivolous or malicious.
H.R. Rep. No. 1079, 52d Cong., Ist Sess. 2 (1892) (statement of Mr. Stockdale); see
McTeague v. Sosnowski, 617 F.2d 1016, 1019 (3d Cir. 1980) ("When Congress opened
the door to in forma pauperis petitions, it was concerned that the removal of the cost
barrier might result in a tidalwave of frivolous or malicious motions .... ). Sua sponte
dismissal of a suit may be a court's only recourse against an abusive IFP plaintiff. Be-
cause of their poverty, plaintiffs proceeding in forma pauperis often are immune from
assignment of costs of unsuccessful actions. See Jones v. Bales, 58 F.R.D. 453, 463 (N.D.
Ga. 1972), aff'd without opinion per curiam, 480 F.2d 805 (5th Cir. 1973); but see supra
note 6 (discussing liability of IFP plaintiffs for court costs). In addition, defendants who
are subject to vexatious suits are unlikely to seek monetary satisfaction through tort ac-
tions, such as abuse of process or malicious prosecution, because it is often pointless to
sue an indigent. See Jones, 58 F.R.D. at 463; accord Cay v. Estelle, 789 F.2d 318, 325
(5th Cir. 1986); Phillips v. Mashburn, 746 F.2d 782, 784 (1 1th Cir. 1984) (per curiam).
Courts, therefore, conclude that broad powers of dismissal are necessary because IFP
plaintiffs do not have these disincentives to deter them from bringing meritless actions.
See Cay, 789 F.2d at 325; Franklin v. Murphy, 745 F.2d 1221, 1226 (9th Cir. 1984);
Anderson v. Coughlin, 700 F.2d 37, 42 (2d Cir. 1983).
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lousness15 or maliciousness. 16 The statute, however, does not outline a
procedure for dismissal."v The lack of clarity has resulted in confusion
among the courts as to the proper time to dismiss a frivolous IFP appli-
cation. 8 Three approaches have emerged that stem primarily from dif-
ferent interpretations of sections 1915(a) and 1915(d): postfiling
immediate dismissal, 19 postfiling delayed dismissal2 ° and prefiling dismis-
15. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(d) (1982). There is confusion among the circuits as to the
proper standard for frivolousness. See Jones v. Morris, 777 F.2d 1277, 1279-80 (7th Cir.
1985) (dismissal appropriate if there is "no rational argument in law or facts to support
[the] claim for relief") (quoting Corgain v. Miller, 708 F.2d 1241, 1247 (7th Cir. 1983));
Anderson v. Coughlin, 700 F.2d 37, 40 (2d Cir. 1983) (dismissal appropriate only if it
appears "beyond doubt that plaintiff can prove no set of facts that would entitle him to
relief") (quoting Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46 (1957)). Courts also consider
factors beyond the face of the complaint. See, e.g., Cruz v. Beto, 405 U.S. 319, 329 (1972)
(Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (looking at whether facially non-frivolous complaint was
barred under doctrine of res judicata); In re Green, 598 F.2d 1126, 1128 (8th Cir. 1979)
(complaint viewed in light of plaintiff's past history); Gast v. Daily, 577 F. Supp. 14, 15
(E.D. Wis. 1984) (looking at whether plaintiff already has case pending before the court);
see also WSM, Inc. v. Tennessee Sales Co., 709 F.2d 1084, 1088 (6th Cir. 1983) ("Frivol-
ity, like obscenity, is often difficult to define."). The proper standard for defining the
term "frivolous" as used in section 1915(d) is not discussed in this Note. For a discussion
of the issue of frivolousness, see Catz & Guyer, Federal In Forma Pauperis Litigation: In
Search of Judicial Standards, 31 Rutgers L. Rev. 655, 672-79 (1978); Feldman, Indigents
in the Federal Courts: The In Forma Pauperis Statute-Equality and Frivolity, 54 Ford-
ham L. Rev. 413, 415-23 (1985).
16. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(d) (1982). Courts are concerned primarily with frivolousness
and rarely dismiss a complaint for maliciousness. They merely comment on the mali-
cious intent of the plaintiff. See, e.g., Horsey v. Asher, 741 F.2d 209, 213 (8th Cir. 1984)
("[T]hat plaintiff hates the defendant ... does not justify dismissal of the complaint as
malicious."); In re Green, 669 F.2d 779, 781-82 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (out of hundreds of
filings only "some" found by courts to be malicious); Cotner v. Campbell, 618 F. Supp.
1091, 1095 (E.D. Okla. 1985) (although plaintiff clearly demonstrated that he filed com-
plaints with "malicious intent to disrupt the courts," court dismissed complaints as frivo-
lous), aff'd in part sub nom. Cotner v. Hopkins, 795 F.2d 900 (10th Cir. 1986) (per
curiam).
17. Franklin v. Murphy, 745 F.2d 1221, 1226 (9th Cir. 1984) (section 1915(d) "does
not indicate whether any procedural protections are required before . . . dismissal");
Jones v. Bales, 58 F.R.D. 453, 463 (N.D. Ga. 1972) (statute does not state how a court
becomes satisfied that a case is frivolous), aff'd without opinion per curiam, 480 F.2d 805
(5th Cir. 1973).
18. See Franklin v. Murphy, 745 F.2d 1221, 1226 n.4 (9th Cir. 1984) (discussing two
contradictory procedures used in the Ninth Circuit); Wartman v. Branch 7, Civil Div.,
County Court, 510 F.2d 130, 133 (7th Cir. 1975) (discussing different approaches among
the circuits); Lyszaj v. AT&T, 554 F. Supp. 218, 219-21 (E.D. Va. 1982) (discussing two
approaches used in the Fourth Circuit), aff'd, 714 F.2d 131 (4th Cir. 1983); see also
Turner, supra note 2, at 618 (screening practices vary from district to district).
19. Under the procedure of immediate postfiling review, a motion to proceed in forma
pauperis is granted if the applicant meets the financial criteria. The court then dockets
the complaint and subsequently may dismiss it sua sponte upon a finding that the action
is frivolous or that the allegation of poverty is untrue. E.g., Cay v. Estelle, 789 F.2d 318,
322 (5th Cir. 1986); see infra notes 25-39 and accompanying text.
20. Under the procedure of postfiling delayed review, a complaint is docketed and the
motion to proceed in forma pauperis is granted, if the plaintiff meets the financial criteria.
A court, however, cannot dismiss the complaint on grounds of frivolousness until the
issuance of process and the responsive pleadings. E.g., Bayron v. Trudeau, 702 F.2d 43,
45 (2d Cir. 1983); see infra notes 40-52 and accompanying text.
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sal.2 1 The former two procedures condition filing solely on the appli-
cant's economic status.' Once the suit is filed, a court may dismiss the
complaint thereafter on a finding of frivolousness.23 Prefiling dismissal,
by contrast, simultaneously considers both issues of poverty and frivo-
lousness in the initial review of an IFP application.24 The following sec-
tion compares the different approaches and concludes that the statutory
language, early judicial analysis of legislative history, and policy consid-
erations favor prefiling dismissal.
A. Postfiling Review: Immediate Dismissal
Most courts condition filing solely on the IFP applicant's economic
status and, after filing, immediately dismiss frivolous complaints.'
Courts adopting this procedure of postfiling immediate dismissal reason
that Congress vested the judiciary with broad discretion to dismiss under
section 1915(d)26 and that this discretion is necessary to protect the
courts against the potential for abuse inherent in a statute allowing cost-
free lawsuits.2 7
Courts adopting postfiling immediate dismissal note that the liberal
pleading policies of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure do not supply
21. Under the procedure of prefiling dismissal, a court considers not only the financial
eligibility of an applicant, but the merits of the complaint as well. If the motion to pro-
ceed in forma pauperis is denied, the complaint is dismissed before it is ever docketed.
Kg., Wartman v. Branch 7, Civil Div., County Court, 510 F.2d 130, 132 (7th Cir. 1975);
see infra notes 53-75 and accompanying text.
22. See Cay v. Estelle, 789 F.2d 318, 322 (5th Cir. 1986); Franklin v. Murphy, 745
F.2d 1221, 1226 (9th Cir. 1984); Brandon v. District of Columbia Bd. of Parole, 734 F.2d
56, 57-58 (D.C. Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1127 (1985); Anderson v. Coughlin, 700
F.2d 37, 41 (2d Cir. 1983); Green v. White, 616 F.2d 1054, 1055-56 (8th Cir. 1980) (per
curiam); Boyce v. Alizaduh, 595 F.2d 948, 950-51 (4th Cir. 1979); see also Jones v. Bales,
58 F.RD. 453, 464 (N.D. Ga. 1972) (although section 1915 vests courts with broad dis-
cretion to dismiss frivolous suits, courts should not infer "that such suits should not be
allowed [to be] filed"), aff'd without opinion per curiam, 480 F.2d 805 (5th Cir. 1973);
Federal Judicial Center, supra note 2, at 54 (immediate postfiling dismissal preferred).
23. See supra note 22.
24. See Wartman v. Branch 7, Civil Div., County Court, 510 F.2d 130, 132 (7th Cir.
1975).
25. Anderson v. Coughlin, 700 F.2d 37, 41 (2d Cir. 1983) (preferred practice is to first
consider "petitioner's economic status") (citing Federal Judicial Center, supra note 2, at
54, 57-58); Collins v. Cundy, 603 F.2d 825, 827 (10th Cir. 1979) (per curiam) (generally
accepted principle that IFP pleadings entitled to be filed if the "affidavit of property is
facially sufficient"); Boyce v. Alizaduh, 595 F.2d 948, 950 (4th Cir. 1979) ("The practice
observed by most courts is to consider only the petitioner's economic status in making the
decision whether to grant leave to proceed in forma pauperis.") (quoting Federal Judicial
Center, supra note 2, at 54).
26. See Green v. McKaskle, 788 F.2d 1116, 1119 (5th Cir. 1986); Anderson v.
Coughlin, 700 F.2d 37, 42 (2d Cir. 1983); Holloway v. Gunnell, 685 F.2d 150, 155 (5th
Cir. 1982); Collins v. Cundy, 603 F.2d 825, 827 (10th Cir. 1979) (per curiam); Conway v.
Fugge, 439 F.2d 1397, 1397 (9th Cir. 1971) (per curiam).
27. See Jones v. Morris, 777 F.2d 1277, 1279 (7th Cir. 1985); Phillips v. Mashburn,
746 F.2d 782, 784-85 (1 1th Cir. 1984) (per curiam); Anderson v. Coughlin, 700 F.2d 37,
42 (2d Cir. 1983). See supra note 14 and accompanying text.
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sufficient controls to handle IFP applications.28 Under the Rules, a plain-
tiff is given an opportunity to develop his claim by amending the com-
plaint, instituting discovery proceedings, or filing an opposition to a
motion to dismiss.29 The Rules, however, do not give the district courts
general sua sponte powers of dismissal except for want of prosecution.30
Non-indigent plaintiffs, constrained by limitations of time and money,
usually do not misuse these liberal pleading procedures.3 1 Postfiling im-
mediate dismissal courts have found that IFP plaintiffs, who are not
bound by such limitations, often abuse these procedures.32 Several courts
find that some IFP applicants actually have an incentive to file frivolous
suits.33
28. See Cay v. Estelle, 789 F.2d 318, 325 (5th Cir. 1986) (the Rules "are inadequate
to protect the courts and defendants ... from frivolous litigation") (quoting Jones v.
Bales, 58 F.R.D. 453, 463 (N.D. Ga. 1972), aff'd without opinion per curiam, 480 F.2d
805 (5th Cir. 1973)); Green v. McKaskle, 788 F.2d 1116, 1120 (5th Cir. 1986) (liberal
pleading system is inappropriate for plaintiffs who are not restricted by considerations of
time and money); Anderson v. Coughlin, 700 F.2d 37, 43 (2d Cir. 1983) (liberal notice
pleading "contemplates litigants whose time and funds are limited"); Harvey v. Clay
County Sheriff's Dep't, 473 F. Supp. 741, 744 (W.D. Mo. 1979) (courts may establish
pleading standards stricter than those established by the Rules to "vindicate the princi-
ples underlying § 1915"); see also Jones, 58 F.R.D. at 463-64 (a court rarely grants Rule
12(b) motions to dismiss as the Rules are designed "so that most cases will actually go to
trial if the parties so desire").
29. See Green v. McKaskle, 788 F.2d 1116, 1120 (5th Cir. 1986) (a "liberal opportu-
nity for discovery" permits plaintiffs "to disclose more precisely the basis of both a claim
and a defense and to define more narrowly the disputed facts and issues"); Brandon v.
District of Columbia Bd. of Parole, 734 F.2d 56, 59 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (12(b)(6) motion to
dismiss puts plaintiff "on notice that the legal sufficiency of the complaint is being chal-
lenged" and gives plaintiff "insight into the theory upon which that challenge is made"),
cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1127 (1985); Anderson v. Coughlin, 700 F.2d 37, 43 (2d Cir. 1983)
("[N]otice pleading principles embodied in Rules 8 and 12 are intended to remove techni-
cal obstacles impeding access to the federal courts."); Harvey v. Clay County Sheriff's
Dep't, 473 F. Supp. 741, 745 (W.D. Mo. 1979) (Rules provide devices to enable plaintiffs
to cure deficiencies by amending the original complaint); see also Conley v. Gibson, 355
U.S. 41, 47-48 & n.9 (1957) (noting that the Rules simplified pleading procedures through
liberal discovery and other pretrial procedures).
30. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 41(b). At best, Rule 12(f) authorizes the court to strike re-
dundant or immaterial matter. See Catz and Guyer, supra note 15, at 672 n.109 ("No
[R]ule gives district courts general sua sponte powers directly to dismiss a
pleading ... ").
31. See Cay v. Estelle, 789 F.2d 318, 325 (5th Cir. 1986); Green v. McKaskle, 788
F.2d 1116, 1119 (5th Cir. 1986); Anderson v. Coughlin, 700 F.2d 37, 42 (2d Cir. 1983);
Jones v. Bales, 58 F.R.D. 453, 463 (N.D. Ga. 1972), aff'd without opinion per curiam, 480
F.2d 805 (5th Cir. 1973).
32. See supra note 31 and accompanying text.
33. See Green v. McKaskle, 788 F.2d 1116, 1119 (5th Cir. 1986) (although action
unsuccessful prisoner has gained temporary relief from the tedium of prison life); Phillips
v. Mashburn, 746 F.2d 782, 785 (1 1th Cir. 1984) (per curiam) ("[M]eritless actions offer
inmates an unrestricted method of harassing prison and law enforcement officials."). That
some IFP applicants actually have an incentive to file frivolous actions has been found to
be particularly true of pro se prisoners whose complaints, the majority of which are
deemed frivolous, comprise a large portion of all IFP proceedings. See supra note 2.
Inmates often file complaints merely as a diversion or with the intention of harassing
defendants. See Cruz v. Beto, 405 U.S. 319, 327 (1972) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting)
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In contrast to the Rules, section 1915(d) restricts potential plaintiffs by
creating affirmative conditions that must be satisfied.' Thus, the district
courts may take a more active role at the pleading stage. The power to
act as more than a neutral arbiter is necessary to protect the courts' juris-
diction35 and to prevent the harassment of defendants.36
("Though [an inmate] may be denied legal relief, he will nonetheless have obtained a
short sabbatical in the nearest federal courthouse."); accord Cay v. Estelle, 789 F.2d 318,
325 (5th Cir. 1986); Green v. McKaskle, 788 F.2d 1116, 1119 (5th Cir. 1986); Phillips v.
Mashburn, 746 F.2d 782, 784 (11th Cir. 1984) (per curiam). One prolific filer docu-
mented his intention to harass the courts with numerous frivolous complaints in order to
obtain a release and calculated the costs to the taxpayers:
[O]ver 15 federal law suits... cost tax-payers another S100.00 each (totalling
$1,500.00) just to file them, and another $100.00 pr. month, each just for the
state attorneys to answer each one, each month, which is a total of another
$1,200.00 of tax-payers money, pr. year, pr. case (totalling S 18,000.00 per year)
and if that is multiplied over the intire [sicl 10 years that that one prisoner is to
be kept in prison, it comes to a total cost to the tax-payers of about $363,500.00
just to punish that one prisoner.., for $45.00 worth of marijuana! is it worth it?.
Cotner v. Campbell, 618 F. Supp. 1091, 1094 (E.D. Okla. 1985) (emphasis in original),
aff'd in part sub nom. Cotner v. Hopkins, 795 F.2d 900 (10th Cir. 1986) (per curiam).
Courts have noted that experienced IFP filers may misrepresent facts so as to avoid either
a 12(b) dismissal or summary judgment. See Jones v. Bales, 58 F.R.D. 453, 464 (N.D.
Ga. 1972), aff'd without opinion per curiam, 480 F.2d 805 (5th Cir. 1973).
Further, inmates who have been successful in filing frivolous complaints often school
others to do so as well. See Cotner v. Campbell, 618 F. Supp. 1091, 1095 (E.D. Okla.
1985) (writ writer taught "other prisoners to file their frivolous lawsuits" modelled on his
own successful petition), aff'd in part sub noin. Cotner v. Hopkins, 795 F.2d 900 (10th
Cir. 1986) (per curiam); Procup v. Strickland, 567 F. Supp. 146, 160 n.13 (M.D. Fla.
1983) (prisoner avoided section 1915(d) dismissal by recycling a cognizable claim for
relief by "repeat[ing] the allegation [but] changing the dates and the names of the defend-
ants allegedly involved"), rev'd on other grounds, 760 F.2d 1107 (11 th Cir. 1985), vacated
on other grounds and remanded, 792 F.2d 1069 (11th Cir. 1986); Green v. Wyrick, 428 F.
Supp. 732, 736 (W.D. Mo. 1976) (abusive IFP litigant filed hundreds of claims on his
behalf and admitted to writing hundreds for other inmates); see also Raitport v. Chemical
Bank, 74 F.R.D. 128, 133 (S.D.N.Y. 1977) (noting plaintiff's ability to present a facially
acceptable complaint: "If there existed any viable cause of action against these defend-
ants [plaintiff] is capable of discovering it and stating it.").
Moreover, since the prisons provide inmates with free materials, there is little cost to
filing repeated frivolous lawsuits. See Procup, 792 F.2d at 1071; Green v. McKaskle, 788
F.2d 1116, 1119 (5th Cir. 1986); Cotner, 618 F. Supp. at 1095.
34. See Anderson v. Coughlin, 700 F.2d 37, 43 (2d Cir. 1983); Harvey v. Clay County
Sheriff's Dep't, 473 F. Supp. 741, 743-44 (,V.D. Mo. 1979). IFP plaintiffs are required to
show indigency, see supra note 12, and are required to show that the complaint is not
frivolous, see supra note 14.
35. See Procup, 792 F.2d at 1073 (federal courts have a "constitutional obligation to
protect their jurisdiction from conduct which impairs their ability"); In re Martin-
Trigona, 737 F.2d 1254, 1262 (2d Cir. 1984) (court must act as more than arbiter of
disputes in defense of its constitutional function), cert. denied, 106 S. Ct. 807 (1986);
Hartford Textile Corp. v. Shuffman, 659 F.2d 299, 305 (2d Cir. 1981) (court must protect
its jurisdiction), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 1018 (1982); cf. Dickinson v. French, 416 F. Supp.
429, 434 (S.D. Ala. 1976) (witnesses may be reluctant to testify where defendants subject
them to countless suits, thereby impeding the administration of justice). Cases illustrate
that the Rules do not prevent numerous filings of frivolous complaints by IFP plaintiffs.
See In re Martin-Trigona, 737 F.2d 1254, 1256 (2d Cir. 1984), cerL denied, 106 S. Ct. 807
(1986). Martin-Trigona was a law student, who after being denied admission to the bar,
became a "persistent and calculating" litigator and was the source of hundreds of law-
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Courts adopting a postfiling immediate dismissal procedure argue that
allowing plaintiffs to continue with non-meritorious claims results in
needless expenditure of public monies37 and may obscure meritorious
suits.38 For these reasons of economy and efficiency, the majority of
courts choose to permit postfiling immediate dismissal procedures.39
B. Postfiling Review: Delayed Dismissal
A second approach to handling IFP applications is to permit an IFP
applicant to file a complaint on a showing of indigency, and to delay
dismissal for frivolousness until there has been service of process and
responsive pleadings.' Although courts using this approach acknowl-
suits and motions. See id. His abuse of legal processes was "exemplified not only by the
number and variety of meritless actions" but by the use of pleadings "as a vehicle to
launch vicious attacks upon persons of Jewish heritage." Id. See also In re Green, 669
F.2d 779, 781 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (plaintiff filed over 700 complaints during the course of 10
years, many of which were deliberately repetitive in an attempt to gain a release from
prison); Cotner v. Campbell, 618 F. Supp. 1091, 1097 (E.D. Okla. 1985) (plaintiff clearly
abused his in forma pauperis privilege by filing frivolous lawsuits, repetitive actions, and
suing defendants he knew to be immune), aff'd in part sub nom. Cotner v. Hopkins, 795
F.2d 900 (10th Cir. 1986) (per curiam); Demos v. Kincheloe, 563 F. Supp. 30, 32 (E.D.
Wash. 1982) (clear that plaintiff filing a complaint daily intended to abuse judicial pro-
cess); Carter v. Telectron, Inc., 452 F. Supp. 944, 952-53 (S.D. Tex. 1977) (plaintiff com-
menced over 178 actions, filed duplicative suits simultaneously in several courts, varied
his citizenship allegations to invoke federal diversity jurisdiction and made untrue allega-
tions of poverty).
36. See Harrelson v. United States, 613 F.2d 114, 116 (5th Cir. 1980) (frivolous
claims filed by litigious plaintiffs, though rarely successful on the merits, can be extremely
costly to defendants); Raitport v. Chemical Bank, 74 F.R.D. 128, 133 (S.D.N.Y. 1977)
(frivolous IFP antitrust action "has cost the plaintiff nothing but some time and postage"
but defendants collectively spent "tens of thousands of dollars retaining attorneys, open-
ing files, filing answers and making motions"); Dickinson v. French, 416 F. Supp. 429,
434 (S.D. Ala. 1976) (although action dismissed, defendants incurred considerable legal
expenses in seeking legal assistance); cf Haugen v. Sutherlin, No. 86-5291, slip op. at 3
n.2 (8th Cir. Nov. 3, 1986) (because complaint not dismissed, court incurred expense of
serving over sixty summonses to numerous members of Indiana Supreme Court).
37. See Green v. McKaskle, 788 F.2d 1116, 1120 (5th Cir. 1986); Phillips v. Mash-
burn, 746 F.2d 782, 784 (11th Cir. 1984) (per curiam); Collins v. Cundy, 603 F.2d 825,
828 (10th Cir. 1979); Franklin v. Oregon, 563 F. Supp. 1310, 1324 (D. Or. 1983), aff'd in
part and rev'd in part sub nom. Franklin v. Murphy, 745 F.2d 1221 (9th Cir. 1984).
38. See Procup v. Strickland, 792 F.2d 1069, 1072 (11th Cir. 1986) ("No matter how
efficient a court's administrative procedures may be, when one litigant files upwards of a
lawsuit a day, the claims of other litigants necessarily suffer."); Green v. Wyrick, 428 F.
Supp. 732, 735 & n.4 (W.D. Mo. 1976) (abusive writ-writing activities partially are re-
sponsible for substantive and procedural restrictions being placed on prisoners' rights).
39. See, e.g., Cay v. Estelle, 789 F.2d 318, 322 (5th Cir. 1986); Harris v. Johnson, 784
F.2d 222, 223 (6th Cir. 1986); Phillips v. Mashburn, 746 F.2d 782, 784-85 (11th Cir.
1984); Franklin v. Murphy, 745 F.2d 1221, 1227 (9th Cir. 1984); Brandon v. District of
Columbia Bd. of Parole, 734 F.2d 56, 59 (D.C. Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1127
(1985); Smith v. Bacon, 699 F.2d 434, 436 (8th Cir. 1983); Fries v. Barnes, 618 F.2d 988,
989 (2d Cir. 1980); Collins v. Cundy, 603 F.2d 825, 827 (10th Cir. 1979); Boyce v. Al-
izaduh, 595 F.2d 948, 950 (4th Cir. 1979); Sinwell v. Shapp, 536 F.2d 15, 19 (3d Cir.
1976); Carollo-Gardner v. Diners Club, 628 F. Supp. 1253, 1255 (E.D.N.Y. 1986); Fed-
eral Judicial Center, supra note 2, at 54, 59.
40. Only the Seventh Circuit requires responsive pleadings when an IFP complaint is
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edge that frivolous suits waste judicial resources, they maintain that IFP
plaintiffs should receive the same procedural protections afforded non-
indigent plaintiffs.4
The procedure under delayed postfiling dismissal requires the issuance
of a summons and complaint once the complaint has been filed.42 If the
defendant moves to dismiss, the IFP plaintiff is notified and given an
opportunity to oppose the motion.4 3 In the event of dismissal, the court
must provide the plaintiff with a statement of the grounds for dismissal
and afford the plaintiff an opportunity to cure by amending the
complaint.'
Courts reason that responsive pleadings are essential to the preserva-
tion of the adversarial scheme. They point out that the traditional adver-
sarial relationship is undermined when the court ceases to act as a
neutral arbiter and actively participates at the pleading stage.4 5 In these
cases, a court may appear to be adopting an inquisitorial role46 or acting
as a proponent for the defendant.47 Thus, courts find it inappropriate to
filed. See Wartman v. Branch 7, Civil Div., County Ct, 510 F.2d 130, 132, 134 (7th Cir.
1975). Other courts have expressed a preference for responsive pleadings but permit im-
mediate dismissal in some cases. See Tingler v. Marshall, 716 F.2d 1109, 1110-11 (6th
Cir. 1983); Bayron v. Trudeau, 702 F.2d 43, 45 (2d Cir. 1983); Redwood v. Council of
D.C., 679 F.2d 931, 934 (D.C. Cir. 1982); McTeague v. Sosnowski, 617 F.2d 1016, 1019
(3d Cir. 1980).
41. See McTeague v. Sosnowski, 617 F.2d 1016, 1019 (3d Cir. 1980) (despite concerns
of court congestion and financial burden to public, IFP complaints cannot be dismissed
summarily); Dear v. Rathje, 485 F.2d 558, 560 (7th Cir. 1973) (although court was "not
unsympathetic" to problem of increasing numbers of "'professional litigants,'" it held
that IFP plaintiffs were entitled to responsive pleadings).
The purpose of section 1915 is to afford indigents the same services of the courts as
non-indigent litigants. See Marks v. Calendine, 80 F.R.D. 24, 27 (N.D. W. Va. 1978),
aff'd sub nom. Flint v. Haynes, 651 F.2d 970 (4th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1151
(1982); see also Coppedge v. United States, 369 U.S. 438, 447 (1962) ("The point of
equating the test for allowing a pauper's appeal to the test for dismissing paid cases, is to
assure equality of consideration for all litigants."); Horsey v. Asher, 741 F.2d 209, 211
n.3 (8th Cir. 1984) (section 1915 must be interpreted to afford IFP complaints same
standards applicable to paid complaints); McTeague v. Sosnowski, 617 F.2d 1016, 1019
(3d Cir. 1980) (Congress, in enacting section 1915, mandated that courts should apply
same dismissal procedures to IFP plaintiffs as non-indigent plaintiffs, "[o]therwise the
scales of justice will be tilted against [the] ... poor").
42. See Tingler v. Marshall, 716 F.2d 1109, 1112 (6th Cir. 1983); Nichols v. Schubert,
499 F.2d 946, 947 (7th Cir. 1974).
43. See supra note 42.
44. See Tingler v. Marshall, 716 F.2d 1109, 1112 (6th Cir. 1983).
45. See id. at 1111 (holding dismissal on merits prior to responsive pleadings
improper).
46. Lewis v. New York, 547 F.2d 4, 5 (2d Cir. 1976) (courts should "avoid an inquisi-
torial role").
47. Nash v. Black, 781 F.2d 665, 668 (8th Cir. 1986) (expressing disfavor with imme-
diate dismissal procedures because "district court is cast in the role of a proponent for the
defense, rather than an independent entity"); accord Tingler v. Marshall, 716 F.2d 1109,
1110-11 (6th Cir. 1983) (citing Franklin v. Oregon, 662 F.2d 1337, 1342 (9th Cir. 1981)).
Reluctant to act as protectors for the defendant, these courts maintain that a defendant's
remedies lie in civil actions for abuse of process, or in equity for injunctive relief. See
Dear v. Rathje, 485 F.2d 558, 560 (7th Cir. 1973).
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prevent defendants from making responsive pleadings.48
Moreover, under Rule 4(a) after the complaint is filed, a court clerk
must issue a summons to a non-indigent plaintiff who becomes responsi-
ble for service thereafter on defendant parties.49 Section 1915(c), how-
48. See Holloway v. Gunnell, 685 F.2d 150, 152 n.2 (5th Cir. 1982). Courts should
not presume to act for the defendant. A defendant's option to dismiss for lack of personal
jurisdiction or venue illustrates the problem. The options to dismiss for lack of personal
jurisdiction or venue are threshold matters subject to foreclosure absent timely objection
by the defendant. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(h)(1). A defendant may elect not to raise these
objections, however, in order to foster a substantive disposition on the action. Alterna-
tively, the defendant, having been alerted to the problem, may dispose of the need for
litigation altogether by choosing to settle or amend matters. See Anger v. Revco Drug
Co., 791 F.2d 956, 958 (D.C. Cir. 1986); see also Sinwell v. Shapp, 536 F.2d 15, 19 (3d
Cir. 1976) (it is "inappropriate for the trial court to dispose of the case sua sponte on an
objection to the complaint [i.e. venue] which would be waived if not raised by the defend-
ant(s) in a timely manner"); Holsey v. Bass, 519 F. Supp. 395, 408 (D. Md. 1981) ("Gen-
erally, it is the duty of the defendant to plead affirmative defenses, and the court cannot
raise such defenses . . . ."), aff'd, 712 F.2d 70 (4th Cir. 1983).
Courts also argue that responsive pleadings prevent complications at the appellate
level. If responsive pleadings are dispensed with, an appellate court may be confronted
with a case in which the defendants are not required to participate because they were
never served at the trial level. See Franklin v. Oregon, 662 F.2d 1337, 1341 (9th Cir.
1981) ("[D]efendants are not required to respond on appeal because they were not parties
to the action below."), on remand, Franklin v. Oregon, 563 F. Supp. 1310 (D. Or. 1983),
aff'd in part and rev'd in part sub nom. Franklin v. Murphy, 745 F.2d 1221 (9th Cir.
1984); Wartman v. Branch 7, Civil Div., County Ct., 510 F.2d 130, 133 n.6 (7th Cir.
1975) (summons should issue to ensure having "two opposing parties at the appellate
level"); Bauers v. Heisel, 361 F.2d 581, 584 n.3 (3d Cir. 1966) (in event of appeal defend-
ant may not have been alerted), cert. denied, 386 U.S. 1021 (1967). Consequently, the
courts of appeals will be unable to resolve the merits of the controversy. See Bayron v.
Trudeau, 702 F.2d 43, 46 (2d Cir. 1983) (because district court dismissed complaint
before responsive pleadings there was no record on appeal for court to determine whether
state had acted properly in examining prisoner's documents); Lewis v. New York, 547
F.2d 4, 6 (2d Cir. 1976) (appellate courts were confronted with a controversy where
defendants refused to appear because they were never served and could not resolve the
controversy under such circumstances); Bauers v. Heisel, 361 F.2d 581, 584 n.3 (3d Cir.
1966) (appellant may have been foreclosed from obtaining review of the district court's
determination because appellees were not served), cert. denied, 386 U.S. 1021 (1967).
Issuance of a summons, however, would either assure that two parties would be present
on appeal, or provide a more secure ground for disposition of the complaint on appeal.
See Jones v. Morris, 777 F.2d 1277, 1280-81 (7th Cir. 1985) (by giving defendants oppor-
tunity to deny factual assertions through responsive pleadings, courts have a more secure
ground for dismissing suit, thereby rendering further appeal unnecessary); Phillips v.
Mashburn, 746 F.2d 782, 784 (11th Cir. 1984) (per curiam) (expansion of record through
service of process allows a court to make a more informed decision); Lewis v. New York,
547 F.2d 4, 6 (2d Cir. 1976) (premature dismissal before responsive pleadings may lead to
shuttling suits between appellate and district courts).
49. Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(a). See Cameron v. Fogarty, 705 F.2d 676, 678 (2d Cir. 1983)
("Procedurally, service of process of a filed complaint is not discretionary. [Rules] 3,
4(a)."), aff'd, 806 F.2d 380 (2d Cir. 1986); Franklin v. Oregon, 662 F.2d 1337, 1341 (9th
Cir. 1981) ("[L]iteral reading of [Rule] 4(a) supports the proposition that a summons
must be issued before a dismissal for failure to state a claim . . . ."), on remand, Franklin
v. Oregon, 563 F. Supp. 1310 (D. Or. 1983), aff'd in part and rev'd in part sub nom.
Franklin v. Murphy, 745 F.2d 1221 (9th Cir. 1984); Frankos v. LaVallee, 535 F.2d 1346,
1347 n.1 (2d Cir.) (complaint dismissed erroneously "prior to service of summons as
required by [Rule] 4(a)"), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 918 (1976); Dear v. Rathje, 485 F.2d 558,
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ever, directs officers of the court to issue summons when an IFP
complaint is filed, and to serve process for IFP plaintiffs. 5° Neither the
Rules nor the IFP statute vests a judge with discretion to intervene at
this stage of the pleadings to determine whether the clerk may issue a
summons." Thus, courts reason that under the postfiling delayed dis-
missal approach an IFP complaint may not be dismissed before issuance
of process.5 2
C. Prefiling Dismissal
Although the procedures for postfiling immediate or delayed dismissal
raise important considerations, the procedure of prefiling dismissal is the
best approach for handling frivolous IFP complaints. Moreover, prefil-
ing dismissal is supported by the language of the statute and early judi-
cial interpretation of congressional intent.
Under a prefiling approach, courts review the issues of poverty and
frivolousness prior to the filing of the complaint.5 3 If the IFP application
560 (7th Cir. 1973) (practice of dismissal before issuance of process "is in clear conflict
with Rule 4(a) ... which imposes a duty on the Clerk to issue the summons 'forth-
with' "); see also Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 112 n.5 (1976) (Stevens, J., dissenting)
(although complaint filed, "instead of causing it to be served on the defendants as re-
quired by [Rule] 4, the Clerk ... dismissed [it]"); Bauers v. Heisel, 361 F.2d 581, 584 n.3
(3d Cir. 1966) (expressing disfavor with immediate postfiling dismissal because "the re-
quirements of Rule 4(a) are explicit"), cert. denied, 386 U.S. 1021 (1967); Comment,
State Prisoners. Federal Courts, and Playing by the Rules An Analysis of the Aldisert
Committee's Recommended Procedures for Handling Prisoner Civil Rights Cases, 5 U.
Puget Sound L. Rev. 131, 147 (1981) [hereinafter Playing by the Rules] (under the Rules
"service of process is not discretionary"). But see Cay v. Estelle, 789 F.2d 318, 323 (5th
Cir. 1986) (IFP proceedings can be dismissed when it becomes clear merit is lacking);
Ron v. Wilkinson, 565 F.2d 1254, 1258 (2d Cir. 1977) (automatic service of IFP com-
plaints would place undue hardship on public).
One author argues, however, that the 1983 amendments to Rule 4 (specifically Rule
4(c)(2)(B)(i)) that authorize a court to serve process for IFP plaintiffs also give the court
discretion to determine if summons should issue. See Feldman, supra note 15, at 428 &
nn.100-01. These amendments, however, merely indicate that the court is responsible for
delivery of service. They do not grant the court discretion to determine if process should
issue. See Franklin v. Oregon, 563 F. Supp. 1310, 1317 (D. Or. 1983) (when proceeding
in forma pauperis, procedure for issuance of summonses and service requires court to
provide IFP plaintiff, or his attorney, with necessary forms; then plaintiff "forward[s] the
completed forms to the U.S. Marshal, or a substitute, for service"), aff'd in part and rev'd
in part sub nom. Franklin v. Murphy, 745 F.2d 1221 (9th Cir. 1984).
50. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(c) (1982). This section states: "The officers of the court shall
issue and serve all process, and perform all duties in such cases."
51. See Catz & Guyer, supra note 15, at 672 n.109; Playing by the Rules, supra note
49, at 147-49.
52. See Nichols v. Schubert, 499 F.2d 946, 947 (7th Cir. 1974) (per curiam) (there
is"no reason for circumventing the mandate of Rule 4(a)... simply because the matter
proceeded in forma pauperis"); supra note 49 and accompanying text. Compare Playing
by the Rules, supra note 49, at 146-49 (issuance of process mandatory) and Catz & Guyer,
supra note 15, at 679 (courts should permit all IFP cases to proceed to disposition under
the Rules) with Feldman, supra note 15, at 427-28 & nn.100-01 (1983 amendments to
Rule 4(a) create exception to issuance of process requirement).
53. See Graham v. Riddle, 554 F.2d 133, 134-35 (4th Cir. 1977); Wartman v. Branch
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fails to qualify on either ground, it may be dismissed. 4 Unlike dismissal
after the filing of the complaint, dismissal before filing does not constitute
a disposition on the substantive merits, but is merely a denial of the
application. 5
Although courts practicing postfiling dismissal observe that sections
1915(a) and (d) do not outline a procedure for dismissal,56 they often
conclude that filing the application must take place before a complaint
can be dismissed as frivolous. 7 The explanation offered is that section
1915(a), which refers to the commencement of the suit, applies only to
economic criteria and does not mention frivolousness.5 8  Thus, these
courts conclude that the district court may not consider frivolousness at
this stage of the proceeding.5 9
The Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit offers an alternate inter-
pretation." Its approach centers on the discretion vested in the trial
courts under section 1915(a). In Wartman v. Branch 7, Civil Div.,
County Court,6' the court reasoned that the phrase "may authorize" in
section 1915(a) implies that the district courts must use their discretion
in the initial processing of the IFP application.62 Because the review of
financial eligibility is primarily a factual matter,6" it can be inferred that
this discretion involves the question of frivolousness.' In addition, sec-
7, Civil Div., County Ct., 510 F.2d 130, 132, 134 (7th Cir. 1975); Loum v. Underwood,
262 F.2d 866, 867 (6th Cir. 1959); Lyszaj v. AT&T, 554 F. Supp. 218, 220 (E.D. Va.
1982), aff'd, 714 F.2d 131 (4th Cir. 1983).
54. See Graham v. Riddle, 554 F.2d 133, 134-35 (4th Cir. 1977); Wartman v. Branch
7, Civil Div., County Ct., 510 F.2d 130, 133 (7th Cir. 1975).
55. See Graham v. Riddle, 554 F.2d 133, 134-35 (4th Cir. 1977); Loum v. Under-
wood, 262 F.2d 866, 867 (6th Cir. 1959); see also Taylor v. Gibson, 529 F.2d 709, 714 n.6
(5th Cir. 1976) (noting that once complaint is docketed "any further order in the case...
constitute[s] an adjudication on the merits") (quoting Campbell v. Beto, 460 F.2d 765,
768 (5th Cir. 1972)). Because denial is not an adjudication on the merits, there is no res
judicata effect.
56. See supra notes 17-24 and accompanying text.
57. See Smith v. Bacon, 699 F.2d 434, 436 (8th Cir. 1983) (proper procedure to allow
an IFP filing when IFP papers formally are sufficient and then dismiss pursuant to sec-
tion 1915(d) even where court previously determined that 1915(d) dismissal was war-
ranted). See supra notes 19 & 22 and accompanying text.
58. See Cay v. Estelle, 789 F.2d 318, 322 (5th Cir. 1986) (stating that section 1915(a)
indicated that leave to proceed in forma pauperis is conditioned solely on economic crite-
ria); Watson v. Ault, 525 F.2d 886, 891 (5th Cir. 1976) (only consideration under section
1915(a) "is whether the statements in the affidavit satisfy the requirements of poverty");
Lyszaj v. AT&T, 554 F. Supp. 218, 220 (E.D. Va. 1982) (noting that other cases solely
consider the issue of poverty under section 1915(a)), aff'd, 714 F.2d 131 (4th Cir. 1983).
59. Flint v. Haynes, 651 F.2d 970, 974 n.13 (4th Cir. 1981) (in determining whether
to file a complaint, courts should consider only petitioner's "economic condition") (citing
Boyce v. Alizaduh, 595 F.2d 948, 950-51 (4th Cir. 1979)), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1151
(1982); see supra note 22.
60. See Wartman v. Branch 7, Civil Div., County Ct., 510 F.2d 130, 132 (7th Cir.
1975).
61. 510 F.2d 130 (7th Cir. 1975).
62. See id. at 132.
63. See infra notes 113-16 and accompanying text.
64. Wartman, 510 F.2d at 132.
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tion 1915(a) requires that the IFP plaintiff "state the nature of the ac-
tion."6 The Wartman court interpreted this demand as an indication
that the legal merits necessarily were relevant to the inquiry at this
stage.66 Although the Wartman court conceded that the specific refer-
ence to the issue of frivolousness in section 1915(d) authorizing dismissal
did imply that the case already had been filed, it did not construe this
language as precluding earlier review of the issue of frivolousness. 67 It
maintained instead that dismissal is mentioned in conjunction with frivo-
lousness in order to catch complaints that may have passed initial review,
but subsequently are discovered to be without merit.6"
Early case law also supports the presumption that the frivolousness of
an IFP application should be reviewed before filing. For six decades af-
ter the Statute's enactment in 1892,69 the courts that reviewed IFP pro-
ceedings considered poverty and frivolousness simultaneously at the
prefiling stage, and never questioned their authority or the necessity to
do so.70 Conditioning filing solely on the petitioner's economic status
appears to be a modem development.7 '
Policy considerations of efficiency and fairness make prefiling dismissal
65. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a) (1982).
66. See Wartman, 510 F.2d at 132.
67. See id
68. See id; see also Adkins v. E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co., 335 U.S. 331, 338
(1948) (powers of dismissal pursuant to section 1915(d) intended to safeguard against
false or fraudulent invocation of statute's benefits).
69. Act of July 20, 1892, ch. 209, 27 Stat. 252.
70. See Kinney v. Plymouth Rock Squab, 236 U.S. 43, 45 (1915) (amendments ad-
ding IFP defendants and appeals to 28 U.S.C. § 1915 did not affect discretion of courts to
consider merits of the suit at the initial stages of review); Huffman v. Smith, 172 F.2d
129, 130 (9th Cir. 1949) (construing the permissive words "may authorize" of section
1915(a), which replaced 28 U.S.C.A. § 832 (1948), as giving district courts same discre-
tion they had formerly to deny commencement of IFP action where it appeared that
applicant had no viable cause of action); Gilmore v. United States, 131 F.2d 873, 874 (8th
Cir. 1943) (courts will not grant leave to proceed in forma pauperis if it is clear that
proceeding is without merit); O'Connell v. Mason, 132 F. 245, 247 (1st Cir. 1904) (it is
"extremely unwise... to defeat the manifest and salutary purpose of Congress by making
this meritorious safeguard of power to dismiss apply only to proceedings where the affida-
vit of poverty was filed before the writ was filled out, thereby leaving at large frivolous
cases"); Brinldey v. Louisville & Nashville R.R. Co., 95 F. 345, 348-49 (C.C.W.D. Tenn.
1899) (courts "are not compelled always to accept every suit offered to be filed or begun
... the remedy of initial rejection would have been better placed if this bill... had been
refused a place on the files in the first instance"); In re Collier, 93 F. 191, 192 (D.C.W.D.
Tenn. 1899) (courts did not grant IFP status merely upon a willingness to take the oath
of poverty but required an inquiry into the facts to determine if it were a proper case); see
also Duniway, supra note 2, at 1270-77 (historical analysis of in forma pauperis statutes).
71. The procedure of immediate postfiling dismissal did not emerge until the 1950's.
See, eg., United States ex rel Morris v. Radio Station WENR, 209 F.2d 105, 107 (7th
Cir. 1953) (holding that district court should have permitted IFP litigant to file complaint
before dismissing it in order to have a proper court record), overruled, Wartman v.
Branch 7, Civil Div., County Ct., 510 F.2d 130, 134 (7th Cir. 1975); Higgins v. Steele,
195 F.2d 366, 369 (8th Cir. 1952) ("In the interest of orderly procedure and of keeping
proper court records, it may be advisable to permit the petitioner to file his petition...
and then to dismiss it. . . .") (emphasis added).
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the most effective method of processing frivolous IFP complaints. Both
postfiling delayed dismissal and postfiling immediate dismissal overlook
the waste of judicial resources involved in requiring filing when it is evi-
dent that the claim is without merit. 7z As one court has commented, the
actions of a relatively small number of litigious IFP plaintiffs can tie up
every court in the Country." Moreover, defendants can incur substan-
tial costs in maintaining a defense.74 It is a senseless gesture and poor
procedure to expend court resources to grant leave to proceed in forma
pauperis, only to dismiss immediately after filing due to frivolousness. 75
Thus, dismissing clearly frivolous complaints prior to filing streamlines
dismissal procedures and avoids burdening both courts and defendants
with the costs of unnecessary litigation.
In order to preserve the right of access to the courts of IFP plaintiffs
that section 1915 seeks to establish,76 prefiling dismissal limits dismissal
to complaints that clearly are frivolous.77 Because IFP complaints should
72. See Franklin v. Oregon, 563 F. Supp. 1310, 1324 (D. Or. 1983) (frivolous suits
"cost a lot of money .... It costs [the state] more than $1 million a year to defend
inmates' suits, the vast majority of which are frivolous"), aff'd in part and rev'd in part
sub nom. Franklin v. Murphy, 745 F.2d 1221 (9th Cir. 1984). The determination of
indigency is a costly process. The procedure involves a compilation of data regarding the
applicant's funds over a six-month period. See, e.g., Evans v. Croom, 650 F.2d 521, 522
(4th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1153 (1982); see also Cotner v. Campbell, 618 F.
Supp. 1091, 1096 (E.D. Okla. 1985) ("[E]very document must be noted on the corre-
sponding docket sheet, filed, indexed and stored in facilities already subjected to over-
crowding by the proliferation of other lawsuits .... Courts are usually forced to order the
preparation of special reports so that frivolous actions may be dismissed on the merits."),
aff'd in part sub nom. Cotner v. Hopkins, 795 F.2d 900 (10th Cir. 1986) (per curiam);
Lyszaj v. AT&T, 554 F. Supp. 218, 220 n.2 (E.D. Va. 1982) (determination of plaintiff's
economic status time-consuming and wasteful if claim is frivolous), aff'd, 714 F.2d 131
(4th Cir. 1983); see infra notes 114-19 and accompanying text.
73. See Franklin, 563 F. Supp. at 1323; see Green v. McKaskle, 788 F.2d 1116, 1120
(5th Cir. 1986) (upsurge in IFP proceedings threatens "'both efficient judicial adminis-
tration and the achievement of justice in individual cases' ") (quoting Turner, supra note
2, at 611); Urban v. United Nations, 768 F.2d 1497, 1499-1500 (D.C. Cir. 1985) (per
curiam) (court must protect itself from "[tihe burden on the system when '[tiaced with
just one litigant who has a fanatical desire to flood the courts ... armed with materials
paid for by the state' ") (quoting In re Green, 669 F.2d 779, 786 (D.C. Cir. 1981)); In re
Martin-Trigona, 737 F.2d 1254, 1259 (2d Cir. 1984) (court noted that "voluminous fil-
ings have.., burdened judicial operations to the point of impairing the administration of
justice"), cert. denied, 106 S. Ct. 807 (1986); see also Green v. Camper, 477 F. Supp. 758,
759-68 (W.D. Mo. 1979) (court devoted ten pages of its opinion to listing over 500 ac-
tions filed by Green in his attempt to render the court "unable to administer and process
its docket").
74. See supra note 36.
75. See Graham v. Riddle, 554 F.2d 133, 134-35 (4th Cir. 1977); Richardson v.
Hatch, 134 F. Supp. 110, 114 (W.D. Mich. 1955).
76. See supra notes 12-13 and accompanying text.
77. See, e.g., Carollo-Gardner v. Diners Club, 628 F. Supp. 1253, 1256 (E.D.N.Y.
1986) (alleging conspirancy and discrimination because Diners Club misspelled plaintiff's
name and did not correspond promptly); Demos v. Kincheloe, 563 F. Supp. 30, 31 (E.D.
Wash. 1982) (alleging government violated plaintiff's civil rights because it backed up
treasury notes with gold instead of silver); Lyszaj v. AT&T, 554 F. Supp. 218, 221 (E.D.
Va. 1982) (IFP plaintiff alleging that his constitutional rights were violated by AT&T
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be construed liberally 78 in order to place IFP plaintiffs untrained in legal
procedures on a fair and equal footing with non-indigent parties," those
complaints that are of marginal merit will be filed.
Once the IFP application has passed prefiling review, courts should
allow IFP applicants to receive the benefits of the liberal pleading policies
embodied in the Rules and permit plaintiffs to develop the facts of their
case through service of process, the defendant's answer, and amend-
ments.80 Postfiling immediate dismissal, although stressing efficiency, ap-
pears to shortchange the rights of IFP plaintiffs by denying them
responsive pleading procedures normally afforded to non-indigent plain-
tiffs."1 Responsive pleadings should be required because they allow a
court to expand the record, thereby enabling it to make a more informed
decision regarding the proceedings.8 2
Because prefiling dismissal screens out clearly frivolous complaints,
once the complaint is filed, concern over protecting the right of access to
courts should take precedence over countervailing considerations of effi-
ciency. 3 Thus, prefiling dismissal requires service of process and respon-
sive pleadings to protect the rights of IFP plaintiffs in litigation.' 4 By
streamlining prefiling screening procedures and making responsive plead-
ings obligatory once the IFP plaintiff has passed prefiling review, prefil-
ing dismissal achieves the interests of efficiency furthered by postfiling
immediate dismissal, yet promotes the goals of fairness obtained through
postfiling delayed dismissal.
II. ASSESSMENT OF COSTS AGAINST AN IFP PLAINTIFF
Prefiling review streamlines dismissal and enables trial judges to screen
IFP applications more effectively. To deter the initial institution of frivo-
lous applications, courts also should consider procedures directing IFP
plaintiffs to pay money, either as alternatives or supplements to prefiling
review.8 5 Despite the general consensus among courts as to the validity
because company did not provide germ-free telephones, court noted that even presuming
the facts stated in the complaint were true, "no constitutional deprivation exists"), aff'd,
714 F.2d 131 (4th Cir. 1983).
78. See Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972) (per curiam); Conley v. Gibson,
355 U.S. 41, 45-46 (1957).
79. See id.
80. See supra note 29.
81. See supra notes 41 & 49.
82. See Phillips v. Mashburn, 746 F.2d 782, 784 (11th Cir. 1984) (per curiam); Tin-
gler v. Marshall, 716 F.2d 1109, 1111 (6th Cir. 1983); Anderson v. Coughlin, 700 F.2d
37, 41 (2d Cir. 1983). Because prefiling review screens out IFP applicants intent on abus-
ing judicial process, the predisposition of the courts, after the filing of a complaint, should
lean in favor of aiding IFP plaintiffs who may be unskilled in pleading procedures. See
Tingler v. Marshall, 716 F.2d 1109, 1111 (6th Cir. 1983).
83. See supra note 53 and accompanying text.
84. See supra note 82 and accompanying text.
85. For example, the Seventh Circuit, which uses prefiling review, also authorizes
prepayment procedures. See, e.g., Caldwell v. United States, 682 F.2d 142, 143 (7th Cir.
1982) (per curiam); Zaun v. Dobbin, 628 F.2d 990, 993 (7th Cir. 1980) (per curiam). The
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of different procedures demanding payment from IFP plaintiffs, 8 6 rela-
tively few courts have instituted such measures.87 This section recom-
mends that courts adopt the three methods of payment discussed below,
as a general practice, to limit the filing of frivolous IFP complaints.88
The initial dilemma facing non-indigent parties is whether their action
is worth the cost of suit.89 A non-indigent plaintiff can expect to pay
initial filing fees and court costs.90 Moreover, if the plaintiff is the losing
party, he may be required to pay for the necessary court expenses of the
prevailing party in addition to any litigation expenses he has incurred. 9'
Third Circuit recommends postfiling delayed dismissal, see McTeague v. Sosnowski, 617
F.2d 1016, 1019 (3d Cir. 1980), yet it permits prepayment plans. See, e.g., Jones v. Zim-
merman, 752 F.2d 76, 79 (3d Cir. 1985); Bullock v. Suomela, 710 F.2d 102, 103 (3d Cir.
1983). The Fifth Circuit uses the procedure of postfiling immediate dismissal, see Cay v.
Estelle, 789 F.2d 318, 324 (5th Cir. 1986), in conjunction with prepayment plans. See,
e.g., Green v. Estelle, 649 F.2d 298, 300 (5th Cir. Unit A 1981) (per curiam); Braden v.
Estelle, 428 F. Supp. 595, 596 (S.D. Tex. 1977); see also id. at 597 (procedures of stream-
lining review, "standing alone, cannot solve the.., problems" resulting from the volume
of frivolous suits filed).
86. See, e.g., In re Williamson, 786 F.2d 1336, 1338 (8th Cir. 1986) (section 1915(a)
authorizes institution of partial payment plans); Flint v. Haynes, 651 F.2d 970, 972 (4th
Cir. 1981) (section 1915(e) authorizes a court to assess costs against an IFP plaintiff),
cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1151 (1982).
87. See, e.g., Braden v. Estelle, 428 F. Supp. 595, 601 (S.D. Tex. 1977) (court adopted
partial payment plans and step-by-step plans as "'imaginative and innovative methods
[to deal] with the flood of [IFP] complaints' ") (quoting Taylor v. Gibson, 529 F.2d 709,
717 (5th Cir. 1976)). Six years later, only a few federal district courts had adopted these
innovative procedures to administer in forma pauperis petitions. T. Willging, Partial
Payment of Filing Fees in Prisoner IFP Cases in Federal Courts: A Preliminary Report, vii
(Federal Judicial Center 1984) [hereinafter Willging Report].
88. See Collier v. Tatum, 722 F.2d 653, 655 (1 1th Cir. 1983) (partial filing fees are
necessary to deter IFP plaintiffs who, if they have nothing to lose, may file suits merely to
harass defendants) (citing Evans v. Croom, 650 F.2d 521, 523 (4th Cir. 1981, cert. denied,
454 U.S. 1153 (1982)); Flint v. Haynes, 651 F.2d 970, 973 (4th Cir. 1981) (IFP plaintiffs
have "virtually 'nothing to lose and everything to gain,'" if all costs of litigation are
waived) (quoting Jones v. Bales, 58 F.R.D. 453, 463 (N.D. Ga. 1972), aff'd without opin-
ion per curiam, 480 F.2d 805 (5th Cir. 1973)), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1151 (1982); Evans v.
Croom, 650 F.2d 521, 523 (4th Cir. 1981) (if IFP status can be acquired merely by filing
affidavit of poverty, IFP plaintiffs will have no disincentive to institute vexatious litiga-
tion), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1153 (1982); In re Stump, 449 F.2d 1297, 1298 (1st Cir. 1971)
(per curiam) (requiring small payment in IFP proceedings because it is "all too easy to
file suits ... if it costs nothing whatever to do so"); see also Willging Report, supra note
87, at 1-2.
89. See Evans, 650 F.2d at 524 (by requiring partial payment fee, IFP plaintiff is
forced "to 'confront the initial dilemma ... fac[ing] ... other potential civil litigants' ")
(quoting Braden v. Estelle, 428 F. Supp. 595, 596 (S.D. Tex. 1977)); see also In re Stump,
449 F.2d at 1297 ("[A]lIthough the amount of money involved.., is small, the principle is
not.").
90. See Marks v. Calendine, 80 F.R.D. 24, 30-31 (N.D. W. Va. 1978) (non-indigent
plaintiffs expect to pay filing and docketing fees, and issuance of process fees when they
commence an action), aff'd sub nom. Flint v. Haynes, 651 F.2d 970 (4th Cir. 1981), cert.
denied, 454 U.S. 1151 (1982).
91. Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(d) states: "costs shall be allowed as of course to the prevailing
party unless the court otherwise directs." See generally Bartell, Taxation of Costs and
Awards of Expenses in Federal Court, 101 F.R.D. 553, 563-65 (1984) (overview of the
bases for awarding costs to the prevailing party); Peck, Taxation of Costs in United States
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When the plaintiff has instituted an action in bad faith, courts also may
require the non-prevailing party to pay the defendant's attorney fees.2
The rationale behind requiring the non-indigent plaintiff to pay these
costs has no less force in the case of an IFP plaintiff.9 IFP plaintiffs
should not be excused from the consequences of litigation.94 Courts
should impose costs9" against IFP plaintiffs, such as filing fees, 96 court
costs,97 or monetary sanctions, 98 to force IFP plaintiffs to assess the
merit of their claim. 99 Courts should consider alternative systems of par-
tial payment of court costs, step-by-step payment, or monetary sanctions
to effectuate this goal.
A. Partial Payment Plans
Several courts have adopted partial payment procedures to administer
IFP petitions."°° Under these plans, the IFP applicant is required to pay
District Courts, 37 F.R1D. 481, 485-95 (1965) (overview of the categories and the mechan-
ics involved in taxation of costs).
92. See Badillo v. Central Steel & Wire Co., 717 F.2d 1160, 1165 (7th Cir. 1983);
Lipsig v. National Student Mktg. Corp., 663 F.2d 178, 182 (D.C. Cir. 1980) (per curiam);
Bartell, supra note 91, at 555-56.
93. See Flint v. Haynes, 651 F.2d 970, 974 (4th Cir. 1981) (assessment of costs
against IFP plaintiff as alternative "to make certain that meaningful access to the courts
remains available and equal"), cerL denied, 454 U.S. 1151 (1982); Chevrette v. Marks,
558 F. Supp. 1133, 1135 (M.D. Pa. 1983) (IFP plaintiffs "must be made aware that it is
patently unwise to barrage a court with groundless or repetitive matters").
94. See supra note 93.
95. Civil litigation generally requires a party to pay fees, court costs and other ex-
penses. Fees typically include filing fees, marshall fees, trial fees, jury fees, subpoena fees,
transcript and record fees, and judgment and execution fees. See Marks v. Calendine, 80
F.RD. 24, 30-31 (N.D. W. Va. 1978), aff'd sub nom. Flint v. Haynes, 651 F.2d 970 (4th
Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1151 (1982); Catz & Guyer, supra note 15, at 659-60.
These fees generally are classified as "taxable costs" after the final judgment when they
become recoverable by the prevailing party. The fees that were paid by the prevailing
party may then become the court costs that are taxed against the losing party. See Marks,
80 F.R.D. at 30-31; Catz and Guyer, supra note 15, at 659-60 & n.32. Other expenses
involve such costs as attorneys' fees, reimbursement of witnesses, or expenditures result-
ing from discovery. Although these expenses also are incurred in litigation, they gener-
ally are not recoverable as taxable costs. See id at 660; Bartell, supra note 91, at 589-98;
Peck, supra note 91, at 485-96.
96. See In re Williamson, 786 F.2d 1336, 1338 (8th Cir. 1986) (courts have imple-
mented plans requiring IFP plaintiffs to pay portion of the full filing fee based on estimate
of ability to pay).
97. See Flint v. Haynes, 651 F.2d 970, 974 (4th Cir. 1981) (affirming district court's
decision to assess costs against an unsuccessful IFP plaintiff), cerL denied, 454 U.S. 1151
(1982); see supra note 95.
98. See Cotner v. Hopkins, 795 F.2d 900, 903 (10th Cir. 1986) (per curiam). Plain-
tiff's economic condition, however, may restrict the amount assessed. See In re Ameri-
can President Lines, Ltd., 804 F.2d 1307, 1310 n.5 (D.C. Cir. 1986) (per curiam)
(limiting sanction to amount of $500 bond due to appellant's allegedly indigent status);
see supra note 6.
99. See supra note 87.
100. See e.g., In re Williamson, 786 F.2d 1336, 1339-41 (8th Cir. 1986); Jones v. Zim-
merman, 752 F.2d 76, 78 (3d Cir. 1985); Collier v. Tatum, 722 F.2d 653, 655 (11 th Cir.
1983); Smith v. Martinez, 706 F.2d 572, 574 (5th Cir. 1983); Evans v. Croom, 650 F.2d
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a portion of the filing fee based on an estimation of the party's ability to
pay.101 The purpose of partial payment systems is to require the IFP
plaintiff to evaluate the worth of his claim.'0 2 Partial payment systems
are intended to curb the indiscriminate filing of frivolous lawsuits by
weeding out actions where the IFP plaintiff does not believe the case
justifies even the payment of a reasonable filing fee.'" 3
Authority to institute partial payment systems is derived from section
1915(a), which gives the court discretion to grant IFP status and enables
an indigent to proceed without payment of litigation costs. ' 4 Courts
have construed the language granting judicial discretion to waive costs
entirely as also providing the authority to waive only a portion of those
costs.,0 5
Some courts also have found support for partial payment systems by
reference to the Criminal Justice Act. 0 6 This statute provides for the
appointment of counsel to represent indigent criminal defendants. 0 7
The Criminal Justice Act permits the court to demand partial payment
for legal representation or terminate the appointment, if it finds that the
defendant can afford a portion of the costs. 10 Referring to this statute
521, 522-23 (4th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1153 (1982); Zaun v. Dobbin, 628 F.2d
990, 993 (7th Cir. 1980). But see Caldwell v. United States, 682 F.2d 142, 143 (7th Cir.
1982) (per curiam) (no authority to engraft additional requirement of payment of partial
filing fee in installments onto section 1915); cf. Tyler v. Milwaukee, 740 F.2d 580, 582
(7th Cir. 1984) (court may not engraft an additional requirement on to statute before
permitting filing of IFP complaint where court ordered plaintiff to swear to conduct him-
self properly before granting him leave to proceed in forma pauperis).
101. See infra notes 114-16.
102. See supra notes 88-90 and accompanying text.
103. See Johnson v. Kemp, 781 F.2d 1570, 1572 (1 1th Cir. 1986) (per curiam); Evans
v. Croom, 650 F.2d 521, 524 (4th Cir. 1981) (quoting In re Stump, 449 F.2d 1297, 1298
(1st Cir. 1971) (per curiam)), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1153 (1982); Willging Report, supra
note 87, at 2 (partial payment plans in Northern District of Ohio intended to deter filings
of complaints where plaintiff does not believe case justifies payment of a reasonable filing
fee).
104. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a) (1982). Although section 1915(a) contains no explicit provi-
sion requiring an IFP plaintiff to pay a portion of fees and costs, courts reason that the
permissive language of the statute allows implementation of such plans. See In re Wil-
liamson, 786 F.2d 1336, 1338 (8th Cir. 1986); see also Jones v. Zimmerman, 752 F.2d 76,
78 (3d Cir. 1985) (court held implementation of partial filing fee plan to be within the
authority conferred by section 1915(a)); Braden v. Estelle, 428 F. Supp. 595, 598 (S.D.
Tex. 1977) (section 1915(a) vests district courts with discretion to assess costs); Willging
Report, supra note 87, at 1 (courts have discretion pursuant to section 1915(a) to impose
partial payment plans).
105. In re Williamson, 786 F.2d 1336, 1338 (8th Cir. 1986) (" '[I]f the court may grant
a waiver of 100 percent of the costs on ... items, the court also is vested with the discre-
tion to waive a lesser percentage of such costs.' ") (quoting Braden v. Estelle, 428 F.
Supp. 595, 598-99 (S.D. Tex. 1977)).
106. 18 U.S.C. § 3006A (1982).
107. 18 U.S.C. § 3006A(a), (b) (1982).
108. 18 U.S.C. § 3006A(c) (1982) provides in part:
If at any time after the appointment of counsel ... the court finds that the
person is financially able to obtain counsel or to make partial payment for the
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by analogy,' °9 one court reasoned that if Congress did not adopt an "all
or nothing"" 0 approach in the context of indigent criminal defendents,
then that approach is not required for indigent civil plaintiffs." " Accord-
ingly, when it is economically feasible" 2 for an IFP plaintiff to pay a
portion of the court fees and costs, the court may demand that the plain-
tiff pay a reasonable sum. 11 3
Partial payment systems must be structured carefully to prevent undue
hardship to an IFP plaintiff." 4 Courts have adopted partial payment
plans that reflect this concern." 5 Some courts audit the IFP applicant's
representation, it may terminate the appointment of counsel or authorize pay-
ment ....
109. See Braden v. Estelle, 428 F. Supp. 595, 598-99 (S.D. Tex. 1977) (analogizing to
Criminal Justice Act in context of requiring partial payment of fees); Carter v. Telectron,
Inc., 452 F. Supp. 939, 94243 (S.D. Tex. 1976) (analogizing to Criminal Justice Act in
context of requiring reimbursement of prepaid fees).
110. Braden v. Estelle, 428 F. Supp. 595, 599 (S.D. Tex. 1977).
111. Id ("[I]n the context of a court's obligation towards indigent criminal defendants,
Congress has recognized that.., the court can require partial payment. The same ra-
tionale should be applied to indigent[s] ....").
112. The determination of economic feasibility or hardship is within the discretion of
the court. See Adkins v. E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co., 335 U.S. 331, 337 (1948) (there
are "few more appropriate occasions for use of a court's discretion than [where a] litigant,
asking that the public pay costs of his litigation.... endeavors to saddle the public with
wholly uncalled-for expense"); Johnson v. Kemp, 781 F.2d 1570, 1571-72 (1Ith Cir.
1986) (per curiam) (district courts have wide discretion in determining whether fee is
fair). The determination lends itself to a case-by-case approach. See Adkins, 335 U.S. at
339-40 (IFP applicant need not be destitute to benefit from § 1915); In re Williamson,
786 F.2d 1336, 1340 (8th Cir. 1986) (partial fees should be based on small fixed percent-
ages of IFP applicant's assets or average monthly income); In re Smith, 600 F.2d 714, 716(8th Cir. 1979) (inmates need not deprive themselves of the "small amenities of life" to
proceed in forma pauperis) (quoting Souder v. McGuire, 516 F.2d 820, 824 (3d Cir.
1975)); Temple v. Ellerthorpe, 586 F. Supp. 848, 851 (D.R.I. 1984) (there is "no bright-
line demarcation").
113. Kg., Smith v. Martinez, 706 F.2d 572, 573 (5th Cir. 1983) (court required partial
payment of $3); Williams v. Estelle, 681 F.2d 946, 947 (5th Cir. 1982) (court required
partial fee of $8 to cover filing and service fees), aff'd sub nom. Wiliams v. Procunier,
735 F.2d 875 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1075 (1984); Evans v. Croom, 650 F.2d
521, 523 n.1 (4th Cir. 1981) (court required amounts of $1, $8.70, $24, $33, and $29,
respectively, in five cases), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1153 (1982).
Courts that use partial payment systems disagree only as to the amounts to be charged.
See Jones v. Zimmerman, 752 F.2d 76, 78-79 (3d Cir. 1985) (abuse of discretion to re-
quire $5 filing fee where prisoner monthly wage was $15 and he only had S17 in savings);
Bullock v. Suomela, 710 F.2d 102, 103 (3d Cir. 1983) (abuse of discretion to apply $4
filing fee to inmate with $4.76 in account and average monthly wage of $17.48); Smith v.
Martinez, 706 F.2d 572, 574 (5th Cir. 1983) (not abuse of discretion to require $3 filing
fee to be paid out of next payment to inmate's trust account); Ward v. Werner, 61 F.R.D.
639, 640 (M.D. Pa. 1974) (not abuse of discretion to require filing fee amounting to 30%
of inmate's savings where prisoner had $50 in trust account).
114. See In re Williamson, 786 F.2d 1336, 1338, 1340 (8th Cir. 1986); see also Souder
v. McGuire, 516 F.2d 820, 823 (3d Cir. 1975) (section 1915 is intended to act as an
"entre, not a barrier, to... the federal court[s]"); accord Jones v. Zimmerman, 752 F.2d
76, 79 (3d Cir. 1985); Bullock v. Suomela, 710 F.2d 102, 103 (3d Cir. 1983); Temple v.
Ellerthorpe, 586 F. Supp. 848, 851 (D.RtI. 1984).
115. Courts also should ensure that IFP applicants are aware of the local partial pay-
ment procedures by attaching the information to IFP applications. In re Williamson, 786
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bank balance over a certain period of time. ' 16 After this period, the court
notifies the plaintiff of the assessed amount, if any. The applicant is then
given an opportunity to object or to explain perceived miscalculations. 17
If the applicant refuses to pay after the final determination, the court
may dismiss the complaint pursuant to section 1915(d)." 8 If the appli-
cant has a history of manipulating funds in an attempt to deceive the
court, a court may dismiss with prejudice." 19
Courts using partial payment systems find them helpful in screening
out frivolous complaints. Dismissal of even a few cases for failure to pay
a partial fee can represent a considerable savings of a court's resources. 20
F.2d 1336, 1340 (8th Cir. 1986); see Willging Report, supra note 87, at vii, ix (examining
the procedures for partial payment of filing fees used by the Northern District of Ohio,
Western Division).
116. See In re Williamson, 786 F.2d 1336, 1340 (8th Cir. 1986) (recommending 2 - 6
month period for review); Collier v. Tatum, 722 F.2d 653, 655 (11 th Cir. 1983) (review of
applicant's account extended from Sept. to Feb.); Evans v. Croom, 650 F.2d 521, 522 (4th
Cir. 1981) (using 6 month period for review), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1153 (1982); Willging
Report, supra note 87, at 9 (noting 6 month period for review).
117. See Jones v. Zimmerman, 752 F.2d 76, 79 (3d Cir. 1985) (fairness requires that
IFP applicant be given an opportunity to see court's findings and to correct any misinfor-
mation); Evans v. Croom, 650 F.2d 521, 526 (4th Cir. 1981) (partial payment plan must
give IFP plaintiff the opportunity to justify payment of lower sum), cert. denied, 454 U.S.
1153 (1982); see also Dawson v. Lennon, 797 F.2d 934, 935-36 (1lth Cir. 1986) (claim-
ant's history of objecting in bad faith to assessed amount resulted in dismissal with preju-
dice). Although it may be argued that these procedures are counterproductive in that
they expend court resources, the Willging Report, nonetheless, found prepayment plans
to be a valuable method of conserving judicial resources. See Willging Report, supra note
87, at 21. Moreover, the Report noted that only a small percentage of plaintiffs objected
to the amount assessed by courts: "Dealing with these few objections certainly takes less
time than reviewing the entire pool of in forma pauperis petitions." Id.
118. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(d) (1982). The fee required may be higher than an account
balance where the timing or the nature of a withdrawal indicates that an IFP plaintiff
withdrew funds solely to avoid paying a filing fee in whole or in part. See Evans v.
Croom, 650 F.2d 521, 525-26 (4th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1153 (1982); see also
United States v. Rubinson, 543 F.2d 951, 964 (2d Cir.) (defendant cannot claim indigency
by putting assets into relatives' accounts), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 850 (1976); Brewster v.
North Amer. Van Lines, Inc., 461 F.2d 649, 651 (7th Cir. 1972) (courts must not waste
public funds by underwriting either frivolous claims or allegations of an IFP applicant
who is financially able to pay, as in this case where plaintiff earned $16,500 annually);
Levy v. Federated Dep't Stores, 607 F. Supp. 32, 33-34 (S.D. Fla. 1984) (IFP negligence
action claiming 12 million dollars in compensatory and punitive damages originating
from beauty treatment dismissed where applicant had over $40,000 in savings and assets).
119. Several courts hold that dismissal with prejudice is an appropriate sanction where
an IFP applicant deliberately has filed a false affidavit of poverty or has a history of
manipulating funds. See Thompson v. Carlson, 705 F.2d 868, 869 (6th Cir. 1983) (inten-
tionally misrepresented financial statement); Harris v. Cuyler, 664 F.2d 388, 391 (3d Cir.
1981) ("conscious or intentional acts or omissions"); see also Camp v. Oliver, No. 85-
8500, slip op. at 5026-27 (11th Cir. Sept. 2, 1986) (dismissal with prejudice inappropriate
where no evidence of bad faith).
120. See Braden v. Estelle, 428 F. Supp. 595, 597 (S.D. Tex. 1977) (partial payment
procedures undoubtedly have aided "in the identification and elimination of gross
abuse"). Because partial payment procedures are a fairly recent innovation, the degree to
which these plans are successful in weeding out potentially frivolous complaints has not
yet been determined. See Willging Report, supra note 87, at 20 ("The current study can
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Such findings substantiate that partial payments can be a valuable tool in
deterring cases filed in bad faith.
B. Step-by-Step Payment Plans
Another procedure intended to deter plaintiffs from proceeding in
forma pauperis with non-meritorious actions is a system of step-by-step
payment. Courts that adopt a step-by-step approach hold that the initial
grant of IFP status does not continue automatically until the final judg-
ment. 121 The court has authority at any time during the IFP proceedings
to waive or to order payment of costs for any of the benefits that may
arise under the statute.122
Statutory authority to institute such a procedure is derived from the
provision in section 1915(a) that permits an IFP plaintiff to commence
and maintain an action "without prepayment of fees and costs,"' 23 in
conjunction with section 1915(d) permitting dismissal if the allegation of
poverty is untrue. 24 Section 1915(a) ensures indigents that they may
initiate an action without prepayment of initial docketing or service of
process fees, but it does not indicate that an IFP plaintiff is absolved of
provide only a cursory overview of the success of the innovation."). Courts using partial
payment procedures, however, believe they deter frivolous filings by IFP applicants. A
1983 report from the Southern District of Texas indicates that approximately 20% of
IFP cases were dismissed because IFP applicants failed to comply with a partial filing fee
order. Based on those figures, the court planned to continue the usage of partial payment
procedures. See Wllging Report, supra note 87, at 44-45. The Report found that dismis-
sal of eight cases for failure to pay the partial filing fee resulted in considerable savings of
court resources that would have been used to decide those cases on their merits. See id.
at 21; see also Collier v. Tatum, 722 F.2d 653, 655 (11th Cir. 1983) (affirming district
court's decision to use partial filing fee plan to reduce number of frivolous 1FF com-
plaints fied); Evans v. Croom, 650 F.2d 521, 523, 526 (4th Cir. 1981) (same), cerL de-
nied, 454 U.S. 1153 (1982).
121. A court is not bound by the decision to grant IFF status at the date of filing, and
it should consider all relevant changes in a plaintiff's financial condition occurring prior
to or subsequent to the filing of the application. See Evans v. Croom, 650 F.2d 521, 525
n.12 (4th Cir. 1981) (quoting Carter v. Telectron, Inc., 452 F. Supp. 939, 942 (S.D. Tex.
1976)), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1153 (1982) (per curiam); Braden v. Estelle, 428 F. Supp.
595, 599 (S.D. Tex. 1977) (quoting Flowers v. Turbine Support Div., 507 F.2d 1242, 1245
(5th Cir. 1975)). Conversely, an IFF plaintiff who is ordered to pay a portion of the filing
fee is not foreclosed from proceeding in forma pauperis as to other expenses incurred
thereafter. See Braden v. Estelle, 428 F. Supp. 595, 599 (S.D. Tex. 1977) (court stated
that "decisions relating to indigency can be made at any stage of the proceedings") (citing
Flowers, 507 F.2d at 1245).
122. Carter v. Telectron, Inc., 452 F. Supp. 939, 942 (S.D. Tex. 1976) (when allegation
of poverty is no longer true due to subsequent improvement in the IFP plaintiff's finan-
cial condition, "it is within the authority of [the] Court to dismiss the proceeding" pursu-
ant to section 1915(d)).
123. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a) (1982).
124. lId at § 1915(d). See Carter v. Telectron, Inc., 452 F. Supp. 939, 943 (S.D. Tex.
1976) ("[§ 1915(a)] and [§ 1915(d)] of the statute [28 U.S.C. § 1915] provide that a court
may exercise.., discretion" to determine whether a plaintiff should be denied the benefits
of the statute because of his financial status) (quoting Adkins v. E.I. DuPont de Nemours
& Co., 335 U.S. 331, 337 (1948); see supra note 112.
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all responsibility from paying fees and costs.125 Thus, if an IFP plaintiff
prevails and collects a judgment, the court may demand that the plaintiff
reimburse it for court fees incurred in the pending action(s) or in prior
litigation. 126
Similarly, courts hold that reimbursement of court costs and fees may
be ordered before there has been a decision on the merits if they learn
that a plaintiff's financial condition has improved since the original grant
of IFP status.127 Determination of IFP status is fluid and the status may
be acquired or lost at any time during the course of the action.128 There
is no justification for requiring the grant of IFP status to continue
throughout the course of the case, if the claimant becomes able to bear
the costs. 129
Support for step-by-step payment plans also is found in the Criminal
Justice Act, which allows the court to recoup expenses previously in-
curred by the court or, in the alternative, to dismiss the case, if at any
time during the course of litigation an indigent criminal defendant's fi-
nancial condition improves.130 By analogy, the rationale permitting re-
coupment of attorneys' fees from convicted defendants extends to civil
plaintiffs.1 3' The inference is that permission to proceed without "pre-
125. In Marks v. Calendine, 80 F.R.D. 24, 27 (N.D. W. Va. 1978), aff'd sub nom.
Flint v. Haynes, 651 F.2d 970 (4th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1151 (1982), the
court interpreted section 1915(a) as a derogation of sections 1914 and 1921, which re-
quire payment of certain court fees by non-indigent plaintiffs in order to commence a suit.
126. See Holsey v. Bass, 519 F. Supp. 395, 405 n.24 (D. Md. 1981), aff'd, 712 F.2d 70
(4th Cir. 1983); Carter v. Telectron, Inc., 452 F. Supp. 944, 999 (S.D. Tex. 1977); Braden
v. Estelle, 428 F. Supp. 595, 599 (S.D. Tex. 1977); Bartell, supra note 91, at 565-66.
127. See Braden v. Estelle, 428 F. Supp. 595, 599 (S.D. Tex. 1977); Carter v. Telectron,
Inc., 452 F. Supp. 939, 940-44 (S.D. Tex. 1976). For instance, in Carter v. Telectron, Inc.,
the court learned that Carter had obtained a money judgment of approximately $5,400
from another action. It declared that since he was no longer indigent, he would be re-
quired to reimburse the government for the prepaid filing fee in his 40 cases pending
before the court or the actions would be dismissed. See id. at 942, 944. But see Caldwell
v. United States, 682 F.2d 142, 143 (7th Cir. 1982) (per curiam) (no authority for "'pay
as you go approach' ").
128. See supra note 121.
129. See Holsey v. Bass, 519 F. Supp. 395, 405 n.24 (D. Md. 1981) (plaintiff has affirm-
ative duty to inform court promptly if he receives any other money or assets), aff'd, 712
F.2d 70 (4th Cir. 1983); Carter v. Telectron, Inc., 452 F. Supp. 944, 999 (S.D. Tex. 1977)(lack of disclosure on plaintiff's current financial condition might lead to contempt
charges or dismissal).
130. 18 U.S.C. § 3006A(f) (1982) provides in part: "Whenever the.., court finds that
funds are available for payment from or on behalf of a person furnished representation, it
may ... direct that such funds be paid .... ." See United States v. Bracewell, 569 F.2d
1194, 1200 (2d Cir. 1978) (absent abuse of discretion, district court's finding of" 'availab-
lility'" of funds will be upheld); United States v. Wetzel, 488 F.2d 153, 157 (8th Cir.
1973) (defendants' receipt of $19,000 for sale of cattle and possession of real estate ren-
dered them financially able to pay costs incurred in appeal, including attorneys' fees paid
under the Criminal Justice Act); see also Fuller v. Oregon, 417 U.S. 40, 53-54 (1974)(Oregon state statute authorizing recoupment of counsel fees not unconstitutional where
defendants have opportunity to show recovery would comprise undue hardship).
131. See Braden v. Estelle, 428 F. Supp. 595, 599 (S.D. Tex. 1977); Carter v. Telectron,
Inc., 452 F. Supp. 939, 943 (S.D. Tex. 1976).
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payment" of costs does not preclude a court from requiring postfiling
reimbursement in IFP proceedings.132
In sum, an IFP plaintiff has an affirmative duty to inform the court of
any receipt of money or other assets. 33 Upon discovering that such
funds exist, the court may require the party to pay fees prepaid by the
court, or in the alternative, may dismiss the case pursuant to section
1915(d).13 4 If the party deliberately has deceived the court, the court
may elect to dismiss the case with prejudice. t35 A system of step-by-step
payments does not have a chilling effect on indigent plaintiffs without
funds, because payment is required only when it economically is feasi-
ble. 136 Only plaintiffs who are no longer indigent are affected. Conse-
quently, IFP plaintiffs who have become financially solvent are deterred
from abusing the privileges arising from the grant of IFP status.
C. Assessment of Costs and Sanctions
In addition to demanding that a prevailing IFP party reimburse the
government for prepaid court costs, courts also have decided that costs
may be assessed against a non-prevailing IFP party. 37 Authority to as-
sess costs in such cases is derived primarily from section 1915(e) that
states that "judgment may be rendered for costs at the conclusion of the
suit or action as in other cases."' 38 Costs under this provision refer to
the litigation expenses for which the prevailing party may bill the losing
party.139 By reading section 1915(e) in conjunction with section 1915(a),
which postpones payment of litigation expenses, courts conclude that
costs are not waived necessarily when an IFP plaintiff is a non-prevailing
party."4 Accordingly, a court may require the non-prevailing indigent
132. See Carter v. Telectron, Inc., 452 F. Supp. 939, 942 (S.D. Tex. 1976).
133. See supra notes 129-35 and accompanying text.
134. See supra notes 117-18 and accompanying text.
135. See supra note 119 and accompanying text.
136. See supra notes 127-30 and accompanying text. Cf Fuller v. Oregon, 417 U.S. 40,
53-54 (1974) (indigent should not be deterred from exercising constitutional rights any
more than marginally solvent defendant who incurs the cost of an attorney; therefore
attorney recoupment statute did not have chilling effect).
137. See; eg., Flint v. Haynes, 651 F.2d 970, 972 (4th Cir. 1981) (district court em-
powered to award costs to prevailing party even where it previously allowed litigant bene-
fits of section 1915(a)), cerL denied, 454 U.S. 1151 (1982); Pasquarella v. Santos, 416 F.2d
436, 437 n.2 (1st Cir. 1969) (section 1915(a) merely permits party to proceed in forma
pauperis, it does not waive costs permanently); Perkins v. Cingliano, 296 F.2d 567, 569
(4th Cir. 1961) ("Section 1915(e) is too plain to leave any room for doubt, and completely
disposes of the petitioner's contention that costs may not be adjudged against him.").
138. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e) (1982) provides in part: "Judgment may be rendered for
costs at the conclusion of the suit or action as in other cases, but the United States shall
not be liable for any of the costs thus incurred." See Duniway, supra note 2, at 1274
(section 1915(e) is designed to permit a judgment for costs at the conclusion of the suit as
in other cases); supra note 137.
139. See supra note 95.
140. Flint v. Haynes, 651 F.2d 970, 973 (4th Cir. 1981), cert denied, 454 U.S. 1151
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plaintiff to pay a portion of his wages,141 money received from a previous
transaction, or other assets received subsequent to the grant of IFP sta-
tus, 42 until the assessed sums are paid in full.143
Some courts, however, are reluctant to impose such costs on an IFP
plaintiff."4 They find it improper to assess costs in cases when the com-
plaint is dismissed merely because the allegations were insufficient to sur-
vive a motion to dismiss, 145 or when there is a wide disparity of economic
resources between the parties. 14 6 These courts have refused to assess
costs against an IFP plaintiff as a matter of course. 147
Because the purpose of payment plans is to deter filings of frivolous
(1982); Duhart v. Carlson, 469 F.2d 471, 478 (10th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 410 U.S. 958
(1973); Pasquarella v. Santos, 416 F.2d 436, 437 n.2 (1st Cir. 1969).
The purpose of section 1915 and other in forma pauperis statutes is merely to postpone
payment to permit plaintiffs, whose poverty otherwise precludes them from litigating
their claims, to commence and maintain an action. See Marks v. Calendine, 80 F.R.D.
24, 27 (N.D. W. Va. 1978), aff'd sub nom. Flint v. Haynes, 651 F.2d 970 (4th Cir. 1981),
cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1151 (1982). The legislation authorizing institution of suits by
seamen, which is similar in language and purpose to section 1915, is another in forma
pauperis statute allowing a court to assess costs after a final judgment is rendered. See 28
U.S.C. § 1916 (1982). Although the statute exempts seamen from prepayment of costs, it
allows costs to be taxed against the seaman who has lost his suit. In interpreting the
statutory language, courts hold that the statute does not abolish payment of all fees and
costs, but merely postpones their payment. See Hugney v. Consolidation Coal Co., 59
F.R.D. 258, 259 (W.D. Pa. 1973).
141. See Chevrette v. Marks, 558 F. Supp. 1133, 1135 (M.D. Pa. 1983) (court noted
that plaintiff may be ordered to pay percentage of his wages to prevailing defendant, until
assessed sum was fully paid) (citing Ross v. Robinson, No. 79-1210, slip op. at 2-3 (M.D.
Pa. Oct. 8, 1982) (unpublished)); see also Smith v. Martinez, 706 F.2d 572, 574 (5th Cir.
1983) (court based its estimation of partial filing fee on inmate's anticipated wages).
142. See United States v. Wetzel, 488 F.2d 153, 156-57 (8th Cir. 1973) (costs assessed
against IFP defendant out of profit made from sale of cattle); Carter v. Telectron, Inc.,
452 F. Supp. 939, 942 (S.D. Tex. 1976) (court assessed fees against IFP plaintiff out of
judgment award he had received from another lawsuit).
143. See supra note 141.
144. See Marks v. Calendine, 80 F.R.D. 24, 31 (N.D. W. Va. 1978), aff'd sub nom.
Flint v. Haynes, 651 F.2d 970, 973 (4th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1151 (1982).
Although taxation of costs is left to the discretion of a district court, courts should exer-
cise their power sparingly. Cf. Farmer v. Arabian Am. Oil Co., 379 U.S. 227, 235 (1964)
(district court should exercise restraint in its exercise of discretion when assessing costs
not specifically authorized by statute such as transporting witnesses).
145. See Partee v. Lane, 528 F. Supp. 1254, 1265 (N.D. Ill. 1981).
146. Indigency often is grounds for denying payment of court costs to the prevailing
party. See, e.g.,Badillo v. Central Steel & Wire Co., 717 F.2d 1160, 1165 (7th Cir. 1983)
(showing of indigency may overcome payment of award to prevailing party); Maldonado
v. Parosole, 66 F.R.D. 388, 390 (E.D.N.Y. 1975) ("Indigency is a proper ground for
denying costs ... where there is a wide disparity of economic resources between the
parties.").
147. The standard for assessing costs against IFP plaintiffs, however, is not confined to
exceptional cases where a plaintiff litigates in bad faith or the court dismisses the com-
plaint pursuant to section 1915(d). See Flint v. Haynes, 651 F.2d 970, 973 & n.6 (4th Cir.
1981), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1151 (1982). Nor is the fact of indigency a sufficient circum-
stance to excuse a non-prevailing party from payment of costs. See Chevrette v. Marks,
558 F. Supp. 1133, 1135 (M.D. Pa. 1983).
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complaints, not to discourage IFP filings altogether, 4 ' courts generally
should decline to assess costs against a losing party, except in cases of
evident bad faith. 49 Thus, as a general rule, costs would be assessed only
against a multiple filer of frivolous complaints.
150
When IFP plaintiffs have commenced numerous frivolous complaints,
courts should treat them as non-indigent plaintiffs, and assess monetary
or injunctive sanctions against these abusive litigants in place of attor-
neys' fees.' 5 1 Courts also may impose onerous sanctions on an IFP plain-
tiff, provided they are not so burdensome as to deny access to the
courts. 
152
148. See supra notes 89 & 114 and accompanying text.
149. See Marks v. Calendine, 80 F.R1D. 24, 31 (N.D. W. Va. 1978), aff'd sub nom.
Flint v. Haynes, 651 F.2d 970 (4th Cir. 1981), cert denied, 454 U.S. 1151 (1982); see aLso
Farmer v. Arabian Am. Oil Co., 379 U.S. 227, 235 (1964) (discretion to assess costs
against non-prevailing plaintiff should be used sparingly in order not to discourage plain-
tiffs from bringing civil action commenced in good faith); Partee v. Lane, 528 F. Supp.
1254, 1265 (N.D. Ill. 1981) (not proper to assess section 1915(e) fees and costs merely
because allegations are insufficient to survive motion to dismiss); cf. Hughes v. Rowe, 449
U.S. 5, 14-15 (1980) (per curiam) (to assess attorneys' fees against section 1983 plaintiffs
"simply because they do not finally prevail would substantially add to the risks inhering
in most litigation and would undercut the efforts of Congress to promote the vigorous
enforcement of the provisions of Title VII") (quoting Christiansburg Garment Co. v.
EEOC, 434 U.S. 412, 422 (1978)).
150. See Marks, 80 F.R1D. at 31 (court reserved assessment of costs for cases where
trial record shows a complete absence of merit coupled with an intent to use the court as
a vehicle for harassment). Consistent with authority to assess costs pursuant to section
1915(e) is a district court's discretion to choose not to tax costs. See Flint v. Haynes, 651
F.2d 970, 972 n.5 (4th Cir. 1981), cert denied, 454 U.S. 1151 (1982). Thus, a court in the
exercise of its discretion may consider a plaintiff's indigency in denying costs under Rule
54(d). See Badillo v. Central Steel & Wire Co., 717 F.2d 1160, 1165 (7th Cir. 1983).
151. See supra note 5.
152. See Cotner v. Hopkins, 795 F.2d 900, 902 (10th Cir. 1986) (per curiam). The
court held that the imposition of a $1000.00 fine was not presumptively objectionable.
The monetary sanction would only be impermissible if it were to preclude plaintiff's ac-
cess to the courts. See iL at 902. See Abdullah v. Gatto, 773 F.2d 487, 488 (2d Cir. 1985)
(a court may impose onerous conditions if they do not totally preclude plaintiff's access
to the courts); Carter v. United States, 733 F.2d 735, 737 (10th Cir. 1984) (per curiam)
("Restrictive conditions, other than total preclusion, which are available include assess-
ment of damages to the prevailing party and imposition of single or double costs."), cert.
denied, 469 U.S. 1161 (1985); In re Green, 669 F.2d 779, 786 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (abuse of
discretion to order full payment of filing fees in all future actions). A court may require,
however, that an IFP plaintiff carry a stronger burden of proof that he is economically
unable to pay filing fees. See Cotner v. Hopkins, 795 F.2d 900, 902-03 (10th Cir. 1986)
(per curiam); Carter v. Telectron, Inc., 452 F. Supp. 944, 999 (S.D. Tex. 1977).
Courts also employ a variety of injunctive devices to limit egregious filers of frivolous
complaints. See, e.g., Cotner v. Hopkins, 795 F.2d 900, 902 (10th Cir. 1986) (court re-
quired that IFP plaintiff certify all future complaints as provided by Rule 11, accompany
future actions with list of all previously filed actions, and provide court with proof that
defendants had been served with process); Urban v. United Nations, 768 F.2d 1497, 1500
(D.C. Cir. 1985) (per curiam) (litigant required to accompany all future pleadings with
affidavits certifying that claims were novel and he could be subject to contempt proceed-
ings if affidavits proved false); Franklin v. Murphy, 745 F.2d 1221, 1232 (9th Cir. 1984)
(court limited plaintiff to six IFP filings per year holding injunction did not impermissibly
bar his right of access as long as court provided him with an opportunity to request
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Thus, courts have the authority to apply partial payment systems and
step-by-step plans to an IFP litigant as a general rule. Although assess-
ment of costs and monetary sanctions also are permitted, they should not
be applied as a general rule, but should be reserved for the exceptional
case of the multiple filer, to promote the policy consideration of safe-
guarding the access of indigents to the courts. 53
CONCLUSION
Courts are not powerless to curb the tide of frivolous complaints
brought by IFP plaintiffs who choose to abuse the advantages conferred
by 28 U.S.C. § 1915. The Statute vests the courts with broad discretion-
ary powers to control potentially abusive IFP plaintiffs. Thus, courts
may streamline dismissal by instituting prefiling review procedures.
Prefiling review maximizes the efficient processing of IFP applications,
yet simultaneously preserves the rights of an IFP plaintiff by requiring
responsive pleadings.
In addition, the Statute grants a court discretion to institute proce-
dures for assessing costs against an IFP plaintiff. The purpose of 28
U.S.C. § 1915 is to provide equal access to the court for rich and poor
alike. This goal becomes distorted when the IFP plaintiff has nothing to
lose and everything to gain by filing a complaint.' 54 Since non-indigents
routinely must decide if their claim is worth the costs of litigation, it is
not unfair to force IF? plaintiffs to make comparable assessments.
Courts should institute systems for partial payments, step-by-step plans,
and sanctions in order to force IFP plaintiffs to evaluate the worth of
their claims.
Mary Van Vort
additional filings beyond the prescribed number); Green v. White, 616 F.2d 1054, 1056
(8th Cir. 1980) (per curiam) (court required litigant to attach to future complaints list of
all cases previously filed involving the same or similar claims, and to send extra copy to
law clerk of chief judge of district). These injuctions are not unconstitutional because they
do not totally preclude a plaintiff's access to the courts.
153. See supra note 149.
154. See Flint v. Haynes, 651 F.2d 970, 973 (4th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1151
(1982); Temple v. Ellerthorpe, 586 F. Supp. 848, 853 (D.R.I. 1984) ("[R]ight of access is
an equalizing device ... [and] there is no logic in elevating an inmate's standing to sue
above that of any other litigant.").
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